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THE NEW GOSPEL OF WEALTH:  
ON SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS AND THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC GOOD 
Etienne C. Toussaint* 
ABSTRACT 
Since Andrew Carnegie penned his famous Gospel of Wealth 
in 1889, corporate philanthropists have championed considerable 
public good around the world, investing in a wide range of social 
programs addressing a diversity of public issues, from poverty to 
healthcare to criminal justice. Nevertheless, the problem of “the 
Rich and the Poor,” as termed by Andrew Carnegie in his famous 
essay, remains unsolved. Socially conscious investors have 
recently called for America to reimagine a new “gospel of wealth”, 
one that not only grapples with the what of social injustice, but 
also explores the how and the why of systemic social and economic 
inequality. An emerging social finance tool, the social impact bond 
(“SIB”), has been praised as a promising platform that can help 
solve many of our social challenges by targeting impact 
investments toward traditionally underfunded social welfare 
programs. 
This Article sets forth a critical examination of the new SIB 
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model, highlighting some of the opportunities for the social finance 
tool to promote social impact, while also revealing several of its 
challenges that may hinder its broader adoption in communities 
across America. In the process, this Article exposes key flaws 
inherent in the design of the SIB model, including its neoliberal 
emphasis on market-based economic development strategies and 
its disregard for the primary role of government in the protection 
and advancement of the public good. It concludes by calling for a 
more progressive economic development framework to guide the 
implementation of the SIB model, one that can help development 
practitioners, philanthropists, and impact investors wrestle with 
the deficiencies of our global capitalist economic system and 
overcome the entrenched systemic barriers to economic justice in 
America. 
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“I never asked for nothin I don’t demand of myself / Honesty, 
loyalty, friends and then wealth.” – Jay-Z, Justify My Thug1 
 
“Our self-awareness—our humility—shouldn’t be limited to 
examining the problems. It should include the structures of 
solutions, like giving itself . . . It is, after all, an offspring of the free 
market; it is enabled by returns on capital.” – Darren Walker2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1889, Andrew Carnegie, the Scottish-born industrialist and 
titan of America’s Gilded Age,3 published The Gospel of Wealth, 
articulating a moral philosophy that has become a touchstone of 
America’s rich philanthropic tradition.4 Carnegie’s collection of 
essays explained his belief in the enduring value of a Darwinian 
capitalist economic system, notwithstanding that system’s 
production of great inequality, as well as his perspective on “the 
duty of the man of Wealth.”5 According to Carnegie, the ideals of 
individualism and human drive should be honored by society, 
principally because the accumulation of capital by the few is 
essential for “the progress of the race” and “the refinement of 
civilization,” while also necessary to help our great nation avoid 
the “universal squalor” that would attend more equitable 
distributions of income.6 Recognizing the inherent tensions in our 
capitalist economic system, creating a world of “Rich and Poor,” 
Carnegie called for the wealthy to live “unostentatious” lives, and 
become “trustees” for the poor, by giving away the majority of their 
wealth after providing “moderately for the legitimate wants” of 
those dependent upon them.7 
Andrew Carnegie did in fact give away almost 90% of his 
wealth during his lifetime, donating over $350 million (nearly $4.8 
billion in 2017 dollars) toward charitable causes and establishing 
thousands of libraries around the world, including some famous 
                                                     
 1. JAY-Z, Justify My Thug, on THE BLACK ALBUM (Roc-A-Fella Records 2003). 
 2. Darren Walker, Why Giving Back Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2015, at A39. 
 3. See Andrew Carnegie Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Nov. 22, 2016), 
http://www.biography.com/people/andrew-carnegie-9238756 [https://perma.cc/H8YX-
MQDG] [hereinafter Andrew Carnegie Biography].  
 4. See generally ANDREW CARNEGIE, “THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH” ESSAYS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS viii–ix (David Nasaw ed., 2006). 
 5. See generally id. at 2–3, 10. 
 6. See id. at 1, 8. 
 7. See id. at 10−12. 
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educational and cultural institutions that are well known today.8 
Contemporary philanthropists like Warren Buffet, Bill Gates, and 
more recently Jeff Bezos, have followed in Andrew Carnegie’s 
footsteps. Indeed, in 2010, Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren 
Buffet founded the Giving Pledge, calling on the world’s wealthiest 
individuals to give away the majority of their wealth.9 
Additionally, Jeff Bezos recently pledged to donate $33 million 
toward an educational scholarship program for immigrants 
brought to the U.S. illegally as children.10 
Nevertheless, while corporate philanthropy has dispensed a 
tremendous amount of good around the world, targeting a wide 
range of social issues from poverty to healthcare to criminal 
justice, the problem of “the Rich and the Poor” has not been solved, 
as Andrew Carnegie predicted it would be.11 Instead, our 
development efforts have fallen short. Despite navigating through 
the horrors of Jim Crow and state-sponsored racial segregation,12 
we still wrestle with racial injustice in the form of mass 
incarceration and racially biased over-policing of minority 
communities.13 Despite donating millions toward education, 
                                                     
 8. Andrew Carnegie built Carnegie Hall and founded the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and 
Carnegie Mellon University, among other educational and cultural institutions. Chloe 
Sorvino, The Gilded Age Family That Gave It All Away: The Carnegies, FORBES (July 8, 
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chloesorvino/2014/07/08/whats-become-of-them-the-
carnegie-family/#2b230f37b550 [https://perma.cc/BFP4-C8H9]; see Andrew Carnegie 
Biography, supra note 3; Evan Andrews, Andrew Carnegie’s Surprise Legacy, HISTORY  
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.history.com/news/andrew-carnegies-surprising-legacy 
[https://perma.cc/T8TR-6BJB].  
 9. Thus far, at least 183 individuals and families have signed onto the Giving 
Pledge, including Tesla’s Elon Musk and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. History of the 
Pledge, GIVING PLEDGE, https://givingpledge.org/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/S646-CQY9] 
(last visited July 2, 2018); id. at Pledge Signatories. 
 10. Michael Stratford and Steven Overly, Amazon’s Bezos to give $33M for 1,000 
Dreamer scholarships, POLITICO (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/1
2/bezos-dreamers-scholarships-337924 [https://perma.cc/R5ZU-8XJD].  
 11. See CARNEGIE, supra note 4, at 12 (“Thus is the problem of Rich and Poor to be 
solved. The laws of accumulation will be left free; the laws of distribution free. 
Individualism will continue, but the millionaire will be but a trustee of the poor; intrusted 
for a season with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering 
it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself.”). 
 12. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY 
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 17, 19, 101 (2018) (discussing, among 
other topics, the effect of public housing on de jure segregation, racially motivated zoning 
laws, and racially motivated taxation policies). 
 13. See Etienne C. Toussaint, Incarceration to Incorporation: Economic 
Empowerment for Returning Citizens Through Social Impact Bonds, 25 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUN. DEV. L. 61, 62 n.3 (2016) (discussing the history of the Black Lives 
Matter movement, which “seek[s] to affirm the lives of Black men and women who, on a 
daily basis, experience the negative impacts of institutionalized white supremacy and 
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millions of children in marginalized communities are still being 
left behind.14 Despite making significant investments toward the 
global health crisis, adequate healthcare remains an uncertainty 
for many American families.15 Despite launching a War on Poverty 
and a Poor People’s Campaign, unemployment remains high, and 
the wealth gap is increasing at an alarming rate.16 At some point, 
we must ask ourselves whether Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel of 
Wealth has failed to save us from the sins of capitalism and instead 
has strengthened our lust for using market-based “Band-Aids” to 
address the systemic and institutional cancer of poverty in 
America. 
Ford Foundation President Darren Walker has recently called 
for America to reimagine a new gospel of wealth, one that 
recognizes that we live in a more enlightened and egalitarian 
world than that of Andrew Carnegie.17 In the spirit of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.,18 Darren Walker argues that we can no longer 
                                                     
structural racism in America” and “has primarily focused on decrying the extrajudicial 
killings of Black people by law enforcement officers, and racial injustices perpetuated by 
the criminal justice system (e.g. racial profiling, police brutality, mass incarceration, etc.)”); 
see generally POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 33–34, 
95–97 (Angela J. Davis, ed., 2017) (discussing, among other topics, racial inequality in the 
justice system and racial profiling). 
 14. See Giving Statistics, CHARITY NAVIGATOR https://www.charitynavigator.org/ 
index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=42 [https://perma.cc/ZS7D-BVM2] (last visited Aug. 25, 
2018) [hereinafter Giving Statistics] (showing that in 2017, American education charities 
received $58.9 billion (up 6.2% from 2016 and 14% of all domestic donation)); NAT’L CTR. 
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2017-051, STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE 
EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS 2017 90–93 (2017) (showing that blacks lagged 
behind other racial groups in college enrollment following high school graduation and in 
overall college enrollment).  
 15. See Giving Statistics, supra note 14 (showing that in 2017, American healthcare 
charities received $38.27 billion (up 15.5% from 2016 and 9% of all domestic donation)); see 
generally DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL INEQUALITY IN 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 57 (2015) (describing the racial gap in healthcare). 
 16. The racial wealth gap in America continues to grow exponentially, leaving many 
low-income communities of color both frustrated and demoralized. See Dedrick Asante-
Muhammad et al., The Road to Zero Wealth: How the Racial Wealth Divide Is Hollowing 
Out America’s Middle Class, INST. FOR POL’Y STUDIES 5 (2017), 
https://prosperitynow.org/files/PDFs/10-2017_Road_to_Zero_Wealth_Slides.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/946S-P27S ] (“If the racial wealth divide is left unaddressed and is not 
exacerbated further over the next eight years, median Black household wealth is on a path 
to hit zero by 2053—about 10 years after it is projected that racial minorities will comprise 
the majority of the nation’s population. Median Latino household wealth is projected to hit 
zero twenty years later, or by 2073. In sharp contrast, median White household wealth 
would climb to $137,000 by 2053 and $147,000 by 2073.”); see generally MEHRSA 
BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP 165, 249–
51 (2017). 
 17. See Walker, supra note 2.  
 18. In 1968, shortly before his assassination, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. launched 
the Poor People’s Movement as a hallmark of the Southern Christian Leadership 
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simply grapple with the what of social injustice; we must also 
unearth and dissect the how and the why of systemic social and 
economic inequality.19 Philanthropists and socially conscious 
investors have recently praised an emerging social finance 
innovation as perhaps a step in the right direction toward this new 
gospel of wealth. Specifically, a growing community of socially 
conscious private investors, aptly called impact investors,20 has 
started to invest in a new social finance tool called the social 
impact bond (“SIB”). The SIB, a type of “pay-for-success” contract, 
works by establishing mission-driven partnerships between the 
public sector, the philanthropic sector, and the private sector.21 
Private investors commit to making strategic investments toward 
social welfare programs with predetermined timelines and 
established performance benchmarks.22 An intermediary 
organization coordinates the operation of the SIB and plays a 
central role in selecting service providers who facilitate SIB 
programs.23 At the completion of a SIB program, if the service 
providers have successfully met the established performance 
benchmarks as assessed by an independent evaluator, the 
government stakeholder repays the impact investors their original 
investment along with a return on their investment based upon 
governmental cost savings.24 Uniquely, if the SIB program is 
deemed unsuccessful after its metric-based evaluation has been 
completed, some impact investors are not repaid. Instead, based 
upon the terms of the SIB contract, impact investors assume the 
financial risks of the SIB investment and take a monetary loss.25 
                                                     
Conference’s economic justice strategy, demanding an economic “Bill of Rights,” among 
other demands. See GERALD D. MCKNIGHT, THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 
THE FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN 20 (1998).  
 19. See Walker, supra note 2. 
 20. See Chelsea McGrath, The Government’s Role in Unleashing Impact Investing’s 
Full Potential, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 799, 803 (2017) (“Impact investing refers to ‘investments 
made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate social and 
economic impact alongside a financial return.’”); see also Susan R. Jones, Is Social 
Innovation Financing Through Social Impact Bonds the Last Hope for Community 
Economic Development Programs During the Trump Administration?, 26 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUN. DEV. L. 351, 357 (2017) (“Impact investors are diverse, ranging from 
pension funds, financial advisors, family foundations, and institutions to government 
investors and nonprofit organizations.”). 
 21. See Emily Gustafsson-Wright et al., The Potential and Limitations of Impact 
Bonds: Lessons from the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide, BROOKINGS 1, 4, 6–7 
(July 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Impact-Bondsweb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/URW7-5QU3].  
 22. See McGrath, supra note 20, at 809−10. 
 23. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 6−7. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 15. 
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There is much to applaud regarding the new SIB model. By 
aligning private sector capital from the impact-investing 
community with underfunded social welfare programs, SIBs offer 
the prospect of both financial and social returns for private 
investors, while also helping to address the critical social welfare 
issues of our time.26 And, despite much debate over the benefits 
and drawbacks of the SIB model, the financial tool is increasingly 
being used by governments across the globe to address an eclectic 
array of social challenges, including prisoner recidivism, adoption 
and long-term foster care placement, services for struggling 
families to avoid foster care, homelessness, and services for 
disadvantaged and at-risk youth.27 The SIB model has already 
been used to successfully fund interventions that either go beyond 
core governmental services or combine existing governmental 
services in unique ways.28 
Further, the SIB model addresses a longstanding challenge 
                                                     
 26. Impact investments are commonly defined as “investments intended to create 
positive impact beyond financial return.” NICK O’DONOHOE ET AL., J.P. MORGAN GLOB. 
RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET 
CLASS 14 (2010), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/socialfinance/document/ 
impact_investments_nov2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U28-WQCU]. However, unlike 
traditional impact investments that ask investors to trade lower social returns for higher 
financial gain, the SIB directly correlates financial and social returns, with the amount of 
financial return dependent upon the amount of social good created by the SIB program. 
Deborah Burand, Globalizing Social Finance: How Social Impact Bonds and Social Impact 
Performance Guarantees Can Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 447, 461−462 (2013). 
 27. See McGrath, supra note 20, at 855 (“There is SIB activity in Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.”); 
Jennifer Giovannitti & Joshua Ogburn, Growing the Pipeline of Pay-for-Success Projects, 
COMMUNITY PRAC. PAPERS, Feb. 2018, at 1, https://www.richmondfed.org/-
/media/richmondfedorg/publications/community_development/practice_papers/2018/practi
ce_papers_2018-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM7D-ACAV] (noting that “there are 20 PFS 
projects in the United States ([over] 100 across the globe) that are considered launched, 
meaning the feasibility and structuring processes are complete, and investors have agreed 
to the formal structure and terms. These projects cross a range of issue areas, including 
early childhood, workforce development, recidivism, homelessness and many others”). 
Additionally, the SIB model has branched into the international development and 
humanitarian aid market as well through the “development impact bond” and the 
“humanitarian impact bond”. See generally CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. & SOC. FIN., INVESTING 
IN SOCIAL OUTCOMES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT BONDS (Oct. 2013), https://www.cgdev.org/ 
topics/development-impact-bonds [https://perma.cc/R4QQ-PRHG]; see also The World’s 
First “Humanitarian Impact Bond” Launched to Transform Financing of Aid in Conflict-
Hit Countries, INT’L COMM’N OF THE RED CROSS (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/worlds-first-humanitarian-impact-bond-launched-
transform-financing-aid-conflict-hit [https://perma.cc/6S4B-VML7].  
 28. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 13−14 (“For example, pre-primary 
education, mentoring for youth, and family therapy are all high-impact, cross sector 
interventions that fall outside core government services and where service provision by 
nongovernmental organizations is common, if not the norm.”). 
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for development practitioners—identifying how to translate 
impact investments in social infrastructure29 into tangible 
financial vehicles that can monetize their latent economic value. 
This challenge has persisted, principally because governments 
often lack the public resources or political will to “invest in the 
future,” notwithstanding proven research indicating that 
preventative, forward-looking social welfare programs often 
reduce public expenditures in the long run.30 Additionally, public 
policy interventions for our nation’s most vulnerable citizens—
such as the formerly incarcerated, the homeless, or the 
unemployed⎯are often politically unpopular. Research 
demonstrates that political leaders are often unwilling to support 
innovative public policy programs that will be implemented or 
completed only after they leave office, especially when faced with 
the harsh realities of austere fiscal budgets and wide-ranging, 
time-sensitive community needs.31 As a result, the emergence of 
an economic development platform that facilitates preventative, 
forward-looking social welfare programs that stand to bolster 
social infrastructure is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. 
This Article highlights several benefits of the SIB model and 
                                                     
 29. Unlike the physical infrastructure projects that are often the focus of 
conventional economic development programs, social infrastructure projects seek to 
empower low-income families and marginalized individuals with the tools necessary to 
better their lives in the communities where they live by making investments into their 
health, education, and employment prospects. See GEORGIA LEVENSON KEOHANE, CAPITAL 
AND THE COMMON GOOD: HOW INNOVATIVE FINANCE IS TACKLING THE WORLD’S MOST 
URGENT PROBLEMS 148–49, 162 (2016). 
 30. Government spending is often targeted toward “crisis-driven services” that stand 
to yield results within one fiscal year. See Rebecca Leventhal, Effecting Progress: Using 
Social Impact Bonds to Finance Social Services, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 523–24 (2013); 
see also Toussaint, supra note 13, at 78 (“[G]overnment-sponsored social service programs 
are historically remedial in nature, targeting social problems as they arise or after they 
have materialized in communities.”). However, spending on preventative programs can 
yield long-term positive impacts. For example, vaccinations have long been proven a far 
more cost-effective public health intervention than treating diseases after an outbreak or 
pandemic. See KEOHANE, supra note 29, at 162. Additionally, investments in high-quality 
early childhood education, particularly for low-income children in vulnerable communities, 
have been shown to not only improve life prospects but also reduce government funding 
allocated toward remediation services. Id. at 163; see also Benjamin R. Cox, Financing 
Homelessness Prevention Programs with Social Impact Bonds, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
959, 968 (2012) (explaining that “[t]he SIB structure redirects money from safety-net 
programs to more effective early-intervention programs”). 
 31. See PETER UTTING, SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMY: BEYOND THE FRINGE?, 6 
(Zed Books 2015) (“Ongoing constraints associated with market forces, neoliberal ideology 
and conditionality have restricted social spending by governments, thereby opening up the 
space for non-state actors to engage in social service provisioning and ‘proximity services.’”). 
See also Leventhal, supra note 30, at 523–24; Jonathan Boston, How to Overcome Political 
Myopia, STATECRAFTING (Oct. 11, 2016), https://statecrafting.net/how-to-overcome-
political-myopia-73b5567c7179 [https://perma.cc/2WST-3BXE].  
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stands alongside economic development practitioners, public 
policy experts, and legal scholars who emphasize its potential for 
meaningful long-term social impact.32 
Nevertheless, while the SIB model seems to integrate some of 
the best features of traditional “place-based”33 and “people-
based”34 approaches to economic development, as this Article 
reveals, critical challenges have plagued the development of the 
SIB model and may hinder its broader adoption by communities 
across America. Specifically, the SIB is built upon a familiar 
market-based model of economic development that frequently 
deprioritizes the role of community stakeholders, hinders 
democratic engagement, and ultimately stymies long-term social 
and economic justice. Further, key flaws inherent in the design of 
the SIB model, including its neoliberal emphasis on market-based 
economic development strategies and its disregard for the primary 
role of government in the protection and advancement of the public 
good, point toward the need for a more progressive economic 
development framework that can overcome some of the 
                                                     
 32. See Jones, supra note 20, at 353; see also Burand, supra note 26, at 450; Shaifali 
Baliga, Shaping the Success of Social Impact Bonds in the United States: Lessons Learned 
from the Privatization of U.S. Prisons, 63 DUKE L.J. 437, 442–45 (2013); Kevin W. 
Humphries, Not Your Older Brother’s Bonds: The Use and Regulation of Social-Impact 
Bonds in the United States, 76 L. & CONTEMP.PROBS., 433, 435–38 (2014); Pandey et al., 
Use of Social Impact Bonds to Address Social Problems: Understanding Contractual Risks 
and Transaction Costs, 28 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 511, 512–16, 524–26 
(2018), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323387675_Use_of_Social_Impact_ 
Bonds_to_Address_Social_Problems_Understanding_Contractual_Risks_and_Transaction
_Costs [https://perma.cc/CJ2J-XQJG].  
 33. Under this strategy, laws and public policies were crafted to improve the places 
where marginalized neighborhoods existed, typically providing private investors with 
economic incentives to build affordable housing for low-income residents and bring 
commercial opportunities to distressed neighborhoods. For a brief discussion of the history 
of community economic development programs in America, see generally Roger A. Clay, Jr. 
and Susan R. Jones, A Brief History of Community Economic Development, 18 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUN. DEV. L. 257, 259–65 (2009). However, legal scholars 
have noted that place-based economic development programs have often led to less than 
favorable outcomes for minority communities. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space 
and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 332 (1999) 
(explaining that although “urban renewal certainly allowed cities to transform their 
economies in the light of the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, a great many of the 
newly created jobs benefitted primarily suburban commuters.” Additionally, “urban 
renewal often eliminated poor and working-class neighborhoods and replaced them with 
high rise, luxury structures for the more affluent while concentrating public housing sites 
within black neighborhoods”). 
 34. Observing that place-based programs were often economically inefficient and 
failed to promote racial integration, some economic development advocates have promoted 
a “people-based” approach to poverty that focused on helping marginalized families move 
themselves into low-poverty, “high opportunity” suburbs. See generally Greg J. Duncan & 
Anita Zuberi, Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity, 1 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 110, 113–19 (2006). 
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deficiencies of our global capitalist economic system. Such a 
reimagined economic development framework can help guide the 
SIB toward achieving lasting social justice. 
Part II of this Article begins with a brief overview of the 
emerging SIB model, discussing the fundamentals of the financial 
tool and exploring its purpose amidst a dominant pro-business 
dogma of free-market fundamentalism35 and a hidebound 
neoliberal political ideology36 that have come to define American 
political and economic life. This part then transitions into a brief 
political history of the SIB in the U.S., capturing how the 
persistence, diligence, and innovation of the Obama 
administration have paved the way for recent SIB legislation 
under President Donald Trump. 
Part III of this Article discusses how the SIB model has been 
utilized in the criminal justice sector through a discussion of two 
of the earliest SIB programs: (A) the Peterborough Prison SIB in 
the United Kingdom; and (B) the Rikers Island Prison SIB in the 
United States. Part III then explores some of the potential 
opportunities offered by the SIB model, including: (A) the 
expansion of investment capital for social innovation; (B) the 
transfer of investment risk from the public sector to the private 
sector; and (C) the prioritization of evidence-based preventative 
social welfare programs. 
Part IV follows by touching on some of the challenges facing 
the future of SIBs, including: (A) the transaction complexity of SIB 
deals, which may hinder their feasibility for under-resourced 
governments; (B) the execution risks that arise during the 
implementation of complex SIB deals, which vary based upon the 
resources of each community and the stakeholders involved; and 
(C) the political risks associated with SIBs, which can hinder long-
term government support and private sector buy-in.  
In conclusion, this Article calls for scholars to envision a more 
progressive economic development framework in the 
                                                     
 35. See CORNELL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST 
IMPERIALISM 4−5 (2004) (explaining that free-market fundamentalism renders “money-
driven, poll-obsessed elected officials deferential to corporate goals of profit often at the cost 
of the common good” while placing “a premium on the activities of buying and selling, 
consuming and taking, promoting and advertising, and devalu[ing] community, 
compassionate charity, and improvement of the general quality of life”). 
 36. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) (explaining that 
under neoliberal orthodoxy, “[s]tate interventions in markets (once created) must be kept 
to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess 
enough information to second-guess market signal (prices) and because powerful interest 
groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for 
their own benefit”). 
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implementation of the SIB model, one that incorporates a greater 
emphasis on economic justice and democratic engagement. Much 
like earlier “place-based” and “people-based” economic 
development strategies,37 the new SIB model focuses on providing 
much-needed social benefits to marginalized communities yet fails 
to wrestle with much deeper barriers to economic empowerment 
grounded in historic racial segregation, ongoing racial injustice, 
and America’s unrelenting commitment to a hegemonic, global 
capitalist system. A more progressive “justice-based” economic 
development framework guiding SIB implementation would seek 
to address the fatal flaw of many traditional philanthropic and 
economic development innovations⎯they are fundamentally 
designed to economically benefit the wealthy through marginal 
improvements in the lives of the poor and do little to change to the 
status quo of wealth inequality in America.38 This Article 
affirmatively rejects the assertion of Andrew Carnegie that a 
capitalist system that breeds inequality is “beyond our power to 
alter, and therefore to be accepted and made the best of.”39 Instead, 
as Ford Foundation President Darren Walker remarks in his 
reimagined “gospel of wealth” for the 21st century, “we are 
obligated to strengthen and improve the system of which we are 
part.”40 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
Economic development practitioners and socially conscious 
investors seeking to address urban poverty and other social ills 
have traditionally relied upon public-private partnerships to 
develop infrastructure projects in marginalized communities. 
Many of these projects are still in existence today and in many 
                                                     
 37. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Scott L. Cummings, Between Markets and Politics: A Response to Porter’s 
Competitive Advantage Thesis, 82 OR. L. REV. 901, 913 (2003) (“The issue identified by 
scholars has been that oftentimes subsidies are used to attract development that not only 
does little for low-income communities, but has dubious overall effects on city-wide 
prosperity.”); see also McFarlane, supra note 33, at 333 (“Poor inner-city neighborhoods 
have not benefitted from the economic development going on around them because 
economic development promotes capital accumulation and mobility that intentionally 
bypasses poor neighborhoods.”); Balgia, supra note 32, at 460–61.  
 39. See CARNEGIE, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 40. Darren Walker, Toward a New Gospel of Wealth, EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Oct. 1, 
2015), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/toward-a-new-
gospel-of-wealth/ [https://perma.cc/T5WA-6Z5H].  
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ways, have come to define the landscape of urban development 
policy.41 However, many of these same advocates have recently 
begun using similar public-private partnership models to finance 
new social infrastructure projects, tackling a wide range of urban 
development challenges, from the reduction of recidivism to the 
development of social welfare services for the homeless and 
disadvantaged youth. The impact investing community has taken 
a leadership role in bringing together the public, private, and 
philanthropic sectors to leverage private investment capital in 
support of these public-private partnerships. Recent attention has 
focused on an emerging market-based economic development 
model, the social impact bond (“SIB”).42 The SIB, a type of “pay-
for-success” contract for social welfare programs funded by impact 
investors,43 has been declared a promising economic development 
strategy that can drive much-needed investment capital toward 
some of the most debilitating and entrenched social welfare 
problems facing America today.44  
Under the SIB model, government stakeholders, private 
foundations, nonprofit organizations, and private investors form 
contractual partnerships to finance and facilitate social welfare 
programs in marginalized communities with underserved 
                                                     
 41. See Burand, supra note 26, at 449 (“Governments have long used public/private 
partnerships to crowd private sector resources—both financial resources and know-how—
into building large-scale infrastructure projects.”). 
 42. See Emily Gustafsson-Wright & Izzy Boggild-Jones, Paying for Social Outcomes: 
A Review of the Global Impact Bond Market in 2017, BROOKINGS: BLOG (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/2018/01/17/paying-for-social-
outcomes-a-review-of-the-global-impact-bond-market-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/SWL4-
E9YH] (“2017 was an exciting year for social and development impact bonds around the 
globe, with 32 new contracts signed. This brings the total up to 108 contracted impact bonds 
globally, along with many more in design.”). 
 43. Interestingly, the SIB is not actually a “bond” but a financial tool far similar to 
bridge financing. See Steven Godeke & Lyel Resner, Building A Healthy and Sustainable 
Social Impact Bond: The Investor Landscape, GODEKE CONSULTING 5 (Nov. 2012), 
http://connecticutcenter.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-Investor-Landscape.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7KZV-86RD] (arguing that the term “social impact bond” is a misnomer 
because SIBs do not share typical bond features such as scheduled principal payments and 
designated interest rates). 
 44. See JEFFREY LIEBMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A 
PROMISING NEW FINANCING MODEL TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE 
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 29 (2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/social_impact_bonds.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PTG-LSCT] 
(concluding that “any new policy tool with the potential to accelerate solutions in even a 
subset of our nation’s most pressing social problems is an important breakthrough—one 
that deserves careful consideration from the policymaking, philanthropic, and investment 
communities”).  
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populations. Much like the “place-based” Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit program initiated by President Ronald Reagan,45 or the 
various “place-based” development programs instituted under 
President Bill Clinton, including the Empowerment Zone 
Program,46 the HOPE VI program (and later, the Choice 
Neighborhoods program),47 and the New Market Tax Credit 
Program,48 the SIB model offers private investors an opportunity 
to profit from strategic investments into the communities of 
marginalized, low-income Americans. However, the SIB also 
adopts the ideology of “people-based” economic development 
strategies. Much like the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, 
which spanned several decades from the ’70s into the ’90s, and the 
HUD Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing program, which was 
instituted during President George H. W. Bush’s administration,49 
                                                     
 45. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the federal government created the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit program, which provides tax incentives to encourage private 
developers to create affordable rental housing for low-income Americans. See I.R.C. § 42 
(2012); see also David Philip Cohen, Improving the Supply of Affordable Housing: The Role 
of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 537, 537−39 (1998). 
 46. In 1993, Congress created the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Cities 
Demonstration Program, which was designed to create jobs and stimulate business 
investments in economically distressed urban communities through a combination of grant 
and tax credits. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 296−97. The zones were designed to be 
areas of democratic governance and participatory community decision-making. See id. at 
297. 
 47. Under the HOPE VI program (enacted in 1992 under Section 24 of the Housing 
Act of 1937, ch. 896, § 24, 50 Stat. 888, 899, amended by Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act of 1998 § 535, 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (2010)) and later the Choice 
Neighborhoods grant program, the federal government provided public subsidies to private 
developers to redevelop struggling public housing developments into new high-quality 
mixed-income developments. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., Hope VI Program 
Authority and Funding History (Mar. 2007), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents//DOC_9
838.PDF [https://perma.cc/NLP9-TSLQ].  
 48. Established as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, the New 
Markets Tax Credit Program sought to incentivize commercial and mixed-use real estate 
investments in distressed, low-income communities through a federal tax credit. 
Administered by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Community Development Financial 
Institution (CDFI) Fund and allocated by local Community Development Entities (CDEs) 
across America, the NMTC awarded $1 billion in allocation to CDEs during the first year 
of the program, enabling investors to reduce their federal tax liability by $390 million (39% 
of the amount invested into CDEs) over a seven-year period. See Janet Thompson Jackson, 
Can Free Enterprise Cure Urban Ills?: Lost Opportunities for Business Development in 
Urban, Low-Income Communities Through the New Markets Tax Credit Program, 37 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 659, 692−99 (2007) (discussing the origins of the New Markets Tax Credit 
Program).  
 49. See generally Greg J. Duncan & Anita Zuberi, Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux 
and Moving to Opportunity, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 110, 110–22 (2006) (providing an 
“update on Gautreaux lessons” and comparing “its sister program, Moving on 
Opportunity”). 
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the SIB model delivers critical resources into the hands of 
marginalized individuals who need help in their quest toward 
achieving the American Dream. 
Thus, the SIB model seems to strike a middle ground in the 
historic Community Economic Development (“CED”) debate,50 
prioritizing both the private investor and the low-income recipient 
of invested funds.51 However, under the SIB model, private 
investors not only directly fund economic development through 
their support of social welfare programs administered by service 
providers, they also bear the financial risks of those impact 
investments. Indeed, SIB investors are only rewarded with a 
return on their capital investment if the social welfare programs 
sponsored by the SIB have been deemed successful.52 This is 
noteworthy because the philanthropic community often lacks the 
necessary investment capital to scale proven social programs or to 
fill the governmental funding gap during times of fiscal austerity 
or budgetary constraints.53 Moreover, when philanthropists fail to 
provide multi-year funding support, nonprofit service providers 
often struggle to sustain their social impact efforts.54 As a result, 
the SIB has garnered much attention and has been heralded for 
its multi-stakeholder approach that can help overcome 
government funding constraints and political divides. While the 
SIB model is still in its infancy, there has been growing interest 
across the globe in its potential to address diverse social and 
economic challenges in education, employment, criminal justice, 
and social welfare.55 
                                                     
 50. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Essay: Reconciling People and Place in 
Housing and Community Development Policy, 16 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2009) 
(discussing the dichotomy between people-based and place-based policies in community 
development policy).  
 51. This dichotomy is evident in the historic dialogue between Booker T. Washington 
and W.E.B. DuBois during the early 1900s over the best strategy to attain economic and 
political empowerment for formerly enslaved Africans living in emancipated communities 
across America. See Scott Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive 
Politics: Towards a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 410 
(2002); see Lateef Mtima, African-American Economic Empowerment Strategies for the New 
Millennium—Revisiting the Washington-DuBois Dialectic, 42 HOW. L.J. 391, 401−02 (1999). 
 52. See Jones, supra note 20, at 358. 
 53. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 72.  
 54. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 527; see also Cox, supra note 30, at 970 (noting 
that “[m]ulti-year contracts allow service providers to do more service providing and less 
time consuming fundraising”). 
 55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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Despite its growing popularity, there has been debate 
regarding the fundamental purpose of the SIB. This, in turn, has 
influenced the nature of the social welfare programs that have 
been funded by SIBs. Some impact investors and SIB advocates 
primarily view the SIB as a platform to fill the funding gap for 
existing social welfare programs.56 These proven social programs 
are viewed as safe investments for private investors, much like 
traditional place-based economic development programs, 
principally because they are more likely to provide expected 
returns when they are either scaled or replicated in new 
communities. Conversely, some investors and advocates have 
argued that the SIB model should be used to finance innovative 
social programs that would otherwise struggle to obtain funding.57  
While innovative social programs are often riskier for investors 
because they are based upon unproven methodologies or new 
theories of poverty alleviation, they often stand to yield 
transformational, long-term impacts for the communities they 
serve if they are successful. Many of these innovative programs, 
taking a page from the people-based approach to economic 
development, focus specifically on addressing the unique needs of 
the people living in distressed communities.58 
Notwithstanding the diversity of perspectives on the purpose 
of the SIB, the current implementation of this new economic 
development tool largely reflects a neoliberal political ideology 
that promotes a market-based approach to economic development, 
one grounded in a pervasive dogma of free-market 
fundamentalism.59 Consequently, while SIB advocates have 
focused on identifying ways to minimize the financial, political, 
and execution risks for private investors in an effort to encourage 
expansion of the social finance tool, they have paid far less 
attention to how the SIB model can be used to facilitate economic 
justice, economically empower marginalized communities, and 
address our country’s growing wealth gap. 
As described below, the earliest SIBs have been used to 
                                                     
 56. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 73.  
 57. See id. at 74.  
 58. This is not to suggest that there cannot be innovative social welfare programs 
funded by SIBs that focus on empowering communities or addressing community-level 
issues. 
 59. See WEST, supra note 35, at 4−5. 
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address the issue of prisoner recidivism by providing formerly 
incarcerated individuals—referred to as “returning citizens” in the 
criminal justice literature60—with educational resources and job 
counseling to help them successfully reintegrate into society and 
find gainful employment. Much like the Moving to Opportunity for 
Fair Housing “people-based” economic development program, the 
resources offered by these criminal justice SIBs can be viewed as 
“vouchers” in the hands of returning citizens as they seek a better 
life outside of prison. However, the market-based design of many 
SIB programs may obscure opportunities to capitalize on existing 
community-based assets. Further, they may undermine a critical 
need to economically empower existing community members in 
marginalized neighborhoods during the development process. 
A. An Overview of Social Impact Bonds 
The social impact bond, combining elements of results-based 
or performance-based financing and public-private partnerships, 
is a contractual partnership between public and private 
stakeholders that seeks to direct investment capital toward 
preventative, forward-looking social welfare programs. In the 
United States, this represents an opportunity to direct a small 
percentage of the $43 trillion of assets under management by the 
private financial sector toward funding social service providers 
who are implementing social welfare programs in marginalized, 
underserved communities.61 By 2016, four years after the first SIB 
was launched in the United States, U.S. SIBs were supported by 
$91.9 million in private investments.62 If private resources 
continue to be channeled into the impact investing space, there is 
a potential for up to $1 trillion of commercial capital over the next 
ten years to be applied toward the development of SIBs.63 
The traditional SIB model involves six key constituents: (1) 
                                                     
 60. See Susan R. Jones, Representing Returning Citizen Entrepreneurs in the Nation’s 
Capital, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUN. DEV. L. 45, 46 (2016) (explaining that 
“[t]his terminology, designed to be non-stigmatizing in the aftermath of punishments and 
debts paid to society, recognizes the need for returning citizens to reintegrate into their 
communities, get on with their lives, and become productive members of society”). 
 61. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 529.  
 62. Emily Liner, Social Impact Bonds: A New Model for Investing in Social Services, 
THIRD WAY (Sep. 8, 2016), http://www.thirdway.org/report/social-impact-bonds-a-new-
model-for-investing-in-social-services [https://perma.cc/UXB8-7T6P].  
 63. See Jones, supra note 20, at 378. 
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an underserved population; (2) a government entity; (3) impact 
investors; (4) social service providers; (5) an intermediary 
organization; and (6) a program evaluator.64 First, the SIB model 
requires a marginalized or underserved community that stands to 
benefit from preventative, forward-looking social services 
addressing a specific social welfare problem.65 The community 
constituents served by SIB programs are typically underserved or 
marginalized individuals who may or may not receive remedial 
services from public resources. Second, the SIB model includes a 
government contracting authority that serves as the outcome 
payer who commits to paying impact investors a return on their 
investment based upon the program’s successful achievement of 
predefined performance metrics.66 Third, the SIB model includes 
a pool of impact investors—including financial institutions, 
private investors, private foundations, and mission-driven 
philanthropists—who are not only interested in earning a 
financial return on their investments but are also dedicated to 
funding social programs that service needy populations and 
provide a social benefit to society.67 Impact investments provide 
the necessary capital to finance SIB programs, as well as cover fees 
associated with managing SIB projects and evaluating their 
performance after completion. Importantly, impact investors 
assume the financial risks of SIB investments as they are only 
repaid if the social programs have successfully met predefined 
performance metrics after being assessed by an independent 
program evaluator.68 
Fourth, the SIB model includes social service providers, 
frequently nonprofit organizations who are equipped to directly 
serve the target population and deliver an evidence-based, 
preventative social program that addresses an important social 
                                                     
 64. See Laura Callanan et al., From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact 





 65. See id. at 15. 
 66. See id.  
 67. See id. at 14−15.  
 68. See id. at 15−16.  
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welfare issue linked to governmental cost savings.69 Fifth, the SIB 
model includes an intermediary organization that collects the 
impact investments from private investors, manages the 
structuring of the SIB deal between the various stakeholders, 
facilitates the distribution of investment capital to social service 
providers, coordinates the flow of funds among the SIB 
stakeholders during the implementation of the program, and 
assists with the monitoring and general oversight of the SIB’s 
performance throughout its lifecycle.70 Thus, the intermediary 
plays a critical and central role in the lifecycle of every SIB. Sixth, 
the SIB model includes a program evaluator who assesses the 
success of the social program in meeting predefined performance 
metrics. Many SIB models include two distinct evaluator roles: (1) 
an independent program evaluator who is responsible for 
assessing whether the social service provider has met the 
predefined performance metrics; and (2) an evaluation advisor 
who helps establish and define assessment metrics and provides 
ongoing monitoring of the progress of SIB programs during the 
lifecycle of their implementation.71 
Although the development process for a SIB transaction is 
unique to every deal, the SIB typically goes through four stages of 
development. First, the stakeholders conduct a feasibility study, 
which both defines the characteristics of the social problem 
impacting the target population and determines the feasibility of 
the SIB program based upon predefined assessment criteria. To 
determine the feasibility of a SIB, stakeholders look for (1) 
outcome metrics that are both measurable and meaningful 
predictors of the long-term economic impacts of public 
expenditures; (2) a reasonable time horizon to achieve the stated 
outcomes that align with the goals of impact investors;72 (3) 
evidence that service providers can achieve the stated outcomes 
through their social programs; and (4) the appropriate political 
and legal conditions to facilitate a successful SIB program in a 
                                                     
 69. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 24, 29–31, 43–45 (“Service 
providers are said to be motivated to join a SIB because it provides them with a stable, long-
term revenue stream, allowing them to achieve outcomes, and because a SIB might allow 
them to scale a program.”).  
 70. See id. at 8. 
 71. See Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 41. 
 72. See, e.g., Burand, supra note 26, at 456 n.21. 
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particular jurisdiction.73 
Secondly, the SIB deal is structured by lawyers and impact 
investment professionals, an arduous process that involves raising 
investment capital, defining the scope of the social intervention, 
choosing the outcome metrics that establish the evaluation 
methodology, selecting social service providers, and drafting and 
negotiating a large volume of complex contracts defining the 
relationship among all of the stakeholders.74 The third stage of 
development is the implementation stage, which involves the 
provision of social welfare services by service providers and the 
performance management of the various stakeholders involved in 
the SIB deal. Finally, the fourth stage of development involves the 
evaluation of the social program’s outcomes and the repayment of 
impact investors based on how successfully the program achieved 
the predefined performance metrics.75 
At the conclusion of successful SIB programs under the 
current model’s formulation, the benefits are typically three-fold: 
(1) the government constituent reduces the financial risks borne 
by taxpayers for the funding of social welfare programs, while 
simultaneously prioritizing evidence-based, forward-looking 
preventative social programs that offer long-term benefits to 
marginalized communities;76 (2) impact investors secure “double-
bottom-line” returns on their SIB investments—the achievement 
of both social goals and financial return; and (3) social service 
providers gain access to additional investment capital to both scale 
and sustain multi-year social welfare programs designed to 
address some of the most debilitating social challenges of our 
time.77 
There are two general formulations of the SIB model: (1) the 
individual transaction model, which structures the SIB deal 
around a single outcome payment contract; and (2) the fund model, 
which structures the SIB deal to facilitate multiple outcome 
payment contracts through a pool of funds designed to address a 
single social welfare problem.78 The United Kingdom is a 
                                                     
 73. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 4. 
 74. In some cases, social services providers are procured early in the SIB development 
process. See id at 7. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 25. 
 77. See Gordon Berlin, Learning from Experience: A Guide to Social Impact Bond 
Investing, MDRC 2 (Mar. 2016), http://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/Learning_from_ 
Experience_SIB.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CVB-CZKY].  
 78. See Gustafsson-Wright, supra note 21, at 9. 
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recognized leader in establishing and promoting the SIB model, in 
part due to its development of several SIB funds that have 
established a series of SIB transactions addressing employment 
and social welfare issues.79 Within the United States, although 
both the individual transaction and fund models have been 
explored since the launch of the first SIB in New York City in 2012, 
there has been greater support for the individual transaction 
approach.80 While the fund model has been promoted by the U.S. 
federal government and various state and local governments as a 
promising strategy for expansion of SIB programs,81 it has also 
faced some political opposition. 
B. A Brief Political History of SIBs in America 
Beginning in 2011 under the administration of President 
Barack Obama, the U.S. federal government began taking 
legislative steps to promote the development of SIBs and create 
the necessary infrastructure for new laws and public policies 
designed to support SIB programs. In February 2011, President 
Obama included up to $100 million in his proposed fiscal year 2012 
budget to support pilot “pay-for-success” programs targeting 
issues like recidivism, workforce training, and homelessness.82 In 
President Obama’s budgetary proposal for fiscal year 2013, a 
similar request to support pay-for-success initiatives was included 
with the slightly increased amount of $109 million.83 
Unfortunately, a divided Congress did not approve either of these 
requests, stalling government action on the development of a 
robust SIB ecosystem within the U.S.84 
                                                     
 79. See generally Guidance: Social Impact Bonds, GOV.UK (Nov. 16, 2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/social-impact-bonds [https://perma.cc/G54R-RCMN]; see 
Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 11, 57. 
 80. See Liner, supra note 62; PETER RAMDSDEN, OECD, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: STATE 
OF PLAY & LESSONS LEARNT 6 (OECD 2016), https://www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/SIBs-State-Play-
Lessons-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXE5-BTUN].  
 81. Some states have taken steps to promote the SIB fund model. For example, in 
Massachusetts, the state government established a Social Innovation Financing Trust 
Fund to support SIB outcome payments in two separate initiatives. However, the model 
established in Massachusetts differs from the fund model that is popular in the U.K. 
because it does not use the rate card process. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 10, § 35VV 
(Supp. 2013); see Burand, supra note 26, at 476−78. 
 82. Sonal Shah & Kristina Costa, White House Budget Drives Pay for Success and 




 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
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In its 2014 fiscal year budgetary proposal, President Obama’s 
administration again advocated for the development of SIBs, 
requesting nearly $500 million in appropriations to support pay-
for-success programs. This request included a similar proposal as 
the previous two years and an additional budget request of $300 
million to create the Pay-For-Success Incentive Fund at the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury.85 The Pay-For-Success Incentive 
Fund was part of the Social Impact Bond Act (H.R. 4885), which 
was introduced in June 2014 during the 113th Congress by U.S. 
Representatives Todd Young (R-Ind.) and John Delaney (D-Md.) 
with support from additional co-sponsors.86 The new fund was 
modeled after the United Kingdom’s Social Outcome Fund, which 
was designed by the U.K. government to “catalyze and test 
innovative approaches to tackling complex issues using outcomes 
based commissioning.”87 In July 2014, a companion bill, the Pay 
for Performance Act (S. 2691), was introduced in the Senate by 
Senators Michael Bennett (D-Colo.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah).88 
This bipartisan support reflected a consensus on the value of 
bringing private-sector resources to bear toward proven, evidence-
based public service programs. 
In 2015, bipartisan pay-for-success funding bills designed to 
expand federal support for state and local SIBs were reintroduced 
in Congress. Specifically, in March 2015, U.S. Representatives 
Todd Young (R-Ind.) and John Delaney (D-Md.) introduced the 
Social Impact Partnerships Act (H.R. 1336), and in April 2015, 
Senators Michael Bennett (D-Colo.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) 
introduced the Social Impact Partnership Act (S.1089).89 
In March 2016, President Obama signed into law the 
bipartisan Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016 
(P.L. 114-140), jointly sponsored by Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) 
and Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.).90 The commission was 
tasked with developing recommendations for incorporating 
                                                     
 85. See id. 
 86. See id.; H.R. 4885, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 87. See Shah & Costa, supra note 82; for more information, see Commissioning Better 
Outcomes and the Social Outcomes Fund, BIG LOTTERY FUND, 
https://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/global-content/programmes/england/commissioning-
better-outcomes-and-social-outcomes-fund [https://perma.cc/MF69-MKLG] (last visited 
July 18, 2018).  
 88. S. 2691, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 89. H.R. 1336, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1089, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 90. Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 144-140, 130 
Stat. 317; H.R. 1831 (114th): Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1831[https://perma.cc/5PL9-
R7C3] (last visited July 18, 2018). 
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evidence-based policymaking into the design of federal 
programs.91 The commission released a final report, “The Promise 
of Evidence-Based Policymaking,” in September 2017 with 
recommendations on “(1) how the Federal government can provide 
the infrastructure for secure access to data, (2) the mechanisms to 
improve privacy protections and transparency about the uses of 
data for evidence building, and (3) the institutional capacity to 
support evidence building.”92 
In January 2017, during the 115th Congress and under the 
administration of President Donald Trump, building upon the 
momentum established during the Obama administration, 
Representatives Pat Tiberi (R-Ohio) and John Delaney (D-Md.) 
introduced the Social Impact Partnership to Pay for Results Act 
(H.R. 576) with bipartisan support.93 In April 2017, Senators Todd 
Young (R-Ind.) and Michael Bennet (D-Colo.) introduced another 
version of the bill, the Social Impact Partnerships to Pay for 
Results Act (S. 963).94 In June 2017, Representative Adrian Smith 
(R-Nebr.) introduced the Increasing Opportunity through 
Evidence-Based Home Visiting Act (H.R. 2824) to reauthorize the 
Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program, 
which added a pay-for-success component to the funding 
allocation.95 In September 2017, a bipartisan group of senators led 
by Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) introduced the Strong Families 
Act of 2017 (S. 1829), their version of the reauthorization bill.96 In 
October 2017, Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) and Senator Patty 
Murray (D-Wash.) introduced the Foundations for Evidence-Based 
Policymaking Act (H.R. 4174 and S. 2046), the first in a series of 
legislative actions designed to implement the recommendations of 
the Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking.97 
Four years after its initial introduction under the Obama 
                                                     
 91. See Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, 130 Stat. at 318–19; 
see Nicole Truhe, State of Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy, AM. FORWARD: 
BLOG (Dec. 2017), http://www.americaforward.org/state-play-pay-success-evidence-based-
policy-december-2017/ [https://perma.cc/G4D2-5WKN].  
 92. COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCE-
BASED POLICYMAKING (2017), https://www.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/090617cc
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9AA-NDFK].  
 93. See Truhe, supra note 91; H.R. 576, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 94. See Truhe, supra note 91; S. 963, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 95. See Nicole Truhe, State of Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy, 
February 2018, AM. FORWARD: BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.americaforward.org/state-
play-pay-success-evidence-based-policy-february-2018/ [https://perma.cc/6XTT-RVVL]; 
H.R. 2824, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 96. See Truhe, supra note 91. 
 97. See id.; H.R. 4174, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 2046, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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administration, the Social Impact Partnerships to Pay for Results 
Act was finally included as Section 50801 of the Bipartisan Budget 
Act of 2018 and was signed into law by President Trump on 
February 9, 2018.98 One of the first statutory deadlines is 
associated with naming members to the Commission on Social 
Impact Partnerships.99 Additionally, the reauthorization of the 
Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program, 
including its pay-for-success provision, was included as Section 
50601 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.100 The Trump 
administration’s most recent fiscal year 2019 budget proposal 
includes a chapter entitled “Building and Using Evidence to 
Improve Government Effectiveness,” which includes various ideas 
and themes from the Commission on Evidence-Based 
Policymaking’s final report.101 
In addition to requesting funding through the appropriations 
process, the federal government under the Obama administration 
took substantive steps to encourage innovation in the financing 
and implementation of social welfare programs. In 2009, the 
Obama administration created the Office of Social Innovation and 
Civic Participation “to advance opportunity, equality, and justice 
by creating a more outcomes-driven government and social 
sector.”102 In April of that same year, President Obama signed into 
law the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act, which established 
the White House Social Innovation Fund (“SIF”) within the 
Corporation for National and Community Service, a “nearly $1 
billion social impact incubator . . . creating more than 450 public-
private partnerships that deliver high-impact, community-based 
solutions that work.”103 The SIF launched its first competition in 
                                                     
 98. See Truhe, supra note 95; H.R. 1892, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 99. See State of Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy, AM. FORWARD: BLOG 
(May 2018), http://www.americaforward.org/state-of-play-pay-for-success-and-evidence-
based-policy-may-2018/ [https://perma.cc/S8WK-C8UZ] [hereinafter State of Play: Pay for 
Success and Evidence-Based Policy].  
 100. See Truhe, supra note 95; H.R. 1892, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 101. See Truhe, supra note 95. 
 102. Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/sicp [https://perma.cc/5QB8-
5JAU] (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).  
 103. See Federal Agency Announces $13 Million in Funding to Support Pay for Success 
Projects, CORPORATION FOR NAT’L & COMTY SERV. (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nationalservice.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/federal-agency-announces-
13-million-funding-support-pay-success [https://perma.cc/9KHV-J9YT]; Christi Goldfuss & 
David Wilkinson, Pay for Success: New Resources for Better Conservation Outcomes, WHITE 
HOUSE (Dec. 17, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/12/17/pay-success 
[https://perma.cc/34Q2CPF3]; Social Innovation Fund, WHITE HOUSE,https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/administration/eop/sicp/initiatives/social-innovation-fund [https:// 
perma.cc/43PC-NME5] (last visited July 21, 2018) [hereinafter Social Innovation Fund].  
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April of 2010, awarding 11 intermediary grantees that funded 
more than 150 sub-grantees serving low-income communities.104 
In 2014, the White House SIF awarded grants to eight 
organizations to promote the development of SIBs in the U.S., 
including the Harvard Kennedy School’s Social Impact Bond 
Technical Assistance Lab.105 
President Obama’s 2016 fiscal budget included $70 million 
dollars allocated toward the SIF and proposed that 20% be made 
available for pay-for-success projects.106 In April 2016, the 
Corporation for National and Community Service announced 25 
SIB pay-for-success competition sub-awards.107 There have also 
been a few recent initiatives funded by SIF. Through a three-year, 
$2.4 million SIF grant issued in 2016, Third Sector Capital 
Partners, Inc. and Actionable Intelligence for Social Policy (AISP) 
at the University of Pennsylvania are providing several 
governments with technical assistance to develop evidence-based 
social programs.108 Additionally, Social Finance announced the 
second round of the Outcomes Rate Card Development 
Competition, and JPAL North America announced the third round 
of the J-PAL State and Local Innovation Initiative, both designed 
to incentivize governments to create new pay-for-success-
programs.109 
Other governmental agencies have also begun to incorporate 
the SIB framework into their grant programs, including the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, and the Department of Education.110 Alongside the 
                                                     
 104. Social Innovation Fund, supra note 103.  
 105. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 34. 
 106. See CORP. FOR NAT’L & COMMUNITY SERV., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION: FISCAL YEAR 2016 6, 45, 94−95 (Appendix 1) (2016), 
https://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default/files/page/cncs_2016_CBJ_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PE4B-X2EF].  
 107. See Truhe, supra note 91. 
 108. See Emily Wood, Third Sector and AISP Partner with Five Governments to 
Improve Outcomes for Vulnerable Families and Children, THIRD SECTOR CAP. PARTNERS 
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.thirdsectorcap.org/news/third-sector-and-aisp-partner-with-
five-governments-to-improve-outcomes-for-vulnerable-families-and-children/ [https:// 
perma.cc/X78U-NNF8].  
 109. See Truhe, supra note 91. 
 110. The U.S. Department of Justice offered “priority consideration” for Second 
Chance Act grant applicants in fiscal year 2012 that incorporated pay-for-success program 
models in their application. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PAY FOR SUCCESS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S SECOND CHANCE ACT PROGRAMS 
NONPROFIT FINANCE FUND AND DOJ WEBINAR RECORDING, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1 (2012), https://www.bja.gov/Funding/12PayforSuccessFAQ.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S8GR-GLLR]. In 2013, the U.S. Department of Labor announced a $24 
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wide-ranging efforts of the federal government to develop a SIB 
ecosystem in the U.S., various state and local jurisdictions have 
also explored the SIB as a promising CED tool to address poverty 
and other social challenges impacting marginalized 
communities.111 Nevertheless, despite praiseworthy efforts by  the 
government at both the federal and state levels, the SIB model has 
not yet been widely endorsed as a tool to empower marginalized 
communities, nor as a dominant strategy to address systemic 
social and economic inequality. 
C. The Purpose of Social Impact Bonds 
There are competing ideas about the fundamental purpose of 
the social impact bond. Scholars have divided SIB programs into 
three general categories: (1) untested, innovative social welfare 
programs; (2) existing social welfare programs with mixed results 
about their effectiveness when implemented on a limited, large 
scale; and (3) existing social welfare programs with very strong 
evidence of success and the likelihood of greater social impact 
                                                     
million Workforce Innovation Fund to fund pilot pay-for-success programs that provide 
employment services to returning citizens. See News Release: US Labor Department 
Awards Nearly $24 Million in Pay for Success Grants, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 23, 2013), 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20131936 [https://perma.cc/89YV-NYBV]. 
Also, in 2013, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development announced that it 
would provide up to $5 billion in grant dollars to assist with redevelopment efforts in the 
areas impacted by Hurricane Sandy and encouraged the five impacted states to incorporate 
pay-for-success strategies where applicable. See Jonathan Greenblatt, Building a Smarter, 
More Efficient Government through “Pay for Success”, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/11/20/building-smarter-more-efficient-government-
through-pay-success [https://perma.cc/TLW6-CYTA]. In October 2017, the Department of 
Education released a Pay for Success Feasibility Toolkit. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PAY FOR 
SUCCESS FEASIBILITY TOOLKIT: CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL LEADERS (2017), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/inits/ed/pay-for-success/pay-for-success-toolkit.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4MWT-BJYQ].  
 111. Washington D.C. and 29 states have explored pay-for-success programs. See Pay 
for Success Activity Map, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, http://www.payforsuccess.org/activity 
[https://perma.cc/LX2Y-YK7U] (last visited July 22, 2018). Currently, over 20 pay-for-
success projects have been launched in the United States, with the most recent projects in 
Alameda County, Cal., Los Angeles County, Cal., Ventura County, Cal., and King County, 
Wash. See Truhe, supra note 91; see Chicago Child-Parent Center Pay for Success 
Initiative, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND , http://www.payforsuccess.org/project/chicago-child-
parent-center-pay-success-initiative [https://perma.cc/6MMF-MZ5G] (last updated Oct. 17, 
2017); see Utah High Quality Preschool Program, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, 
http://www.payforsuccess.org/project/utah-high-quality-preschool-program [https://perma 
.cc/8YWR-5STE] (last updated July 2, 2018). Additionally, some state legislatures have 
considered establishing pay-for-success funds to support future pilot projects. See State of 
Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy, supra note 99. Colorado recently passed 
legislation to establish a pay-for-success fund to support three pilot projects targeting youth 
involved in child welfare and criminal justice systems. Id. 
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when operated at a larger scale.112 The types of social welfare 
programs that are ultimately funded by SIBs reflect the risk 
appetite of impact investors as they seek to balance financial risks 
with opportunities for social reward.113 
Some impact investors view SIBs primarily as a funding 
platform for innovative, unproven social welfare programs that 
merit testing on a larger scale but are unlikely to be funded by 
government stakeholders because of their high-risk profile.114 
These SIB investors prioritize risky investments, much like 
venture philanthropists and private equity investors, principally 
because such investments offer the prospect of large returns. This 
perspective is not without its benefits. Meaningful social progress 
for marginalized populations undoubtedly requires new ideas and 
unproven, yet promising, development strategies. Further, the 
private sector is potentially in the best position to bear the 
financial risk of unproven social programs because of its access to 
market capital. This investment strategy can also save 
governments from using limited taxpayer dollars to fund social 
welfare programs that may prove to be ineffective, while still 
encouraging the kind of social innovation that yields long-term 
benefits for society.115 
However, there are some impact investors and SIB advocates 
who alternatively view the SIB model as a new tool to help 
governments meet the funding gap for existing, proven social 
welfare programs with strong evidence for success.116 Under this 
                                                     
 112. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 9. 
 113. There has been variety on how SIBs are structured globally that reflects an 
appetite for financial risk versus a commitment to social rewards. The investment 
structures of existing SIBs vary in their similarity to debt—meaning, a more conservative 
investment with fixed repayment timelines and interest rates—versus equity—meaning, a 
riskier investment structure where repayment and interest rates are impacted by the 
performance of the fund recipient. While in the United States many SIBs have been 
structured like debt instruments, in the United Kingdom, many SIB deals are structured 
like equity investments. As a result, SIBs in the U.S. tend to include a larger upfront capital 
commitment from investors, whereas in the U.K., capital recycling is more common, 
meaning that early payments to funders are reinvested into the SIB program to help 
finance ongoing operating costs. Additionally, SIB deals in the U.S. tend to include 
subordinate investments, grants, and investment guarantees more frequently than in other 
countries. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 15−16. 
 114. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 8−9. 
 115. See Max Liang et al., An Overview of Social Impact Bonds, 13 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 
267, 273 (2014). 
 116. Impact investors exhibit diverse expectations for financial and social return. 
While some impact investors are staunchly “impact” oriented and willing to sacrifice 
financial returns to achieve social gain, others believe that their financial returns should 
not be sacrificed when investing in social programs. See YASMIN SALTUK ET AL., J.P. 
MORGAN GLOB. SOC. FIN., PERSPECTIVES ON PROGRESS: THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY, 
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conception of SIBs, the model provides investment capital for low-
risk, proven social welfare programs that can benefit communities 
when operated at scale, while also providing expected returns for 
impact investors.117 This investment strategy is similar to that 
adopted by many traditional CED lenders who seek to empower 
marginalized communities through established, market-driven 
government programs that offer guaranteed returns or predefined 
tax benefits to investors.118 
Although seemingly less risky for impact investors, the 
strategy of prioritizing proven programs has its shortcomings. 
While it may attract a large volume of investments from the 
private sector, it can obscure the role of the government as the 
primary advocate for, and protector of, the public welfare. By 
privatizing the provision of social welfare services that are 
typically managed by governmental constituents, the government 
may unintentionally empower the private sector to dictate the 
landscape of social welfare issues that receive public funding. As a 
result, politically unpopular or challenging social welfare services 
that offer uncertain financial returns for impact investors, or that 
lack clear solutions that can be easily translated into evidence-
based social welfare programs with quantifiable performance 
metrics, may be overlooked and remain underfunded.119 
                                                     
30 (2013), https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/Perspectives%20on%20Progress2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3D6U-HLSZ] (noting that nearly two-thirds of the 99 impact investors 
surveyed target market financial returns for their impact investments); see Burand, supra 
note 26, at 461−62; see also Paula Lantz & Samantha Iovan, When Does Pay-for-Success 
Make Sense?, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/when_does_pay_for_success_make_sense# [https://perma.cc/
G2KZ-L7L7] (“It is difficult to justify the resources, risks, and opportunity costs of PFS 
initiatives when an intervention has no evidence base or when existing evidence raises red 
flags about the impact of a program.”). 
 117. While SIBs were historically conceptualized as a vehicle to finance innovative 
new approaches to complex social problems, in practice, many of the early SIB deals have 
focused on supporting programs that offer strong evidence of success. See Berlin, supra note 
77, at 9. Both the Peterborough SIB and the Rikers Island SIB prioritized service providers 
with a proven track record of success. See generally SOC. FIN., THE ONE* SERVICE. ONE 
YEAR ON 7, 9 (2011), https://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/ 
sf_peterborough_one-_year_on.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZJ8-GX6E] (explaining the One 
Service program funded by the Peterborough SIB); see also Adolescent Behavioral Learning 
Experience (ABLE), N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.nyc.gov/html/ymi/downloads/pdf/a
ble.pdf?epi-content=GENERIC [https://perma.cc/Z6ZN-MKGE] (last visited July 19, 2018) 
(teaching more about the service program at Rikers Island). Additionally, SIB deals have 
structured returns for investors that are more similar to those expected from typical bond 
deals. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 9. Of course, scaling “proven” service programs can still 
introduce many risks. 
 118. For example, program-related investments and community loans under the 
Community Reinvestment Act. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 8. 
 119. See Stephen Sinclair et al., Social Impact Bonds: Shifting the Boundaries of 
Citizenship, in SOCIAL POLICY REVIEW 26: ANALYSIS AND DEBATE IN SOCIAL POLICY 119, 
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Replicating proven social welfare programs in different 
communities (or in different populations within an existing 
community) may provide great value to local or state governments 
by freeing taxpayer dollars to support more innovative public 
programs.120 Indeed, this may account for the growing interest in 
using the SIB model to help scale proven solutions to social 
problems.121 Nevertheless, a critical question emerges: should the 
private sector be responsible for sustaining proven social welfare 
programs into the foreseeable future, or should the ongoing 
funding of public welfare programs fall under the job description 
of government entities funded by taxpayer dollars? If the answer 
lies in the latter camp, impact investors who seek the safer risk 
profile of proven social welfare programs may in fact hinder the 
development of innovative, disruptive SIB programs that can 
challenge the systemic social and economic inequities that plague 
our country.122 
D. The Ethics of Social Impact Bonds 
As we explore the implications of privatizing the delivery of 
some public services through the SIB model, a discussion of the 
role of government in the provision of social welfare services is 
useful. After the financial crisis of 2008, governments across the 
globe expressed increased interest in outsourcing the funding and 
delivery of critical social services.123 However, support for 
outsourcing public services to the private sector is mixed. A 
longstanding challenge facing social justice advocates has been 
identifying how to finance innovation in public welfare service 
                                                     
125−26 (Kevin Farnsworth et al. eds. 2014) (“Assessing performance in relation to outcomes 
rather than narrower indicators does not resolve this problem nor address the incentive to 
game playing—focusing on meeting formal performance targets rather than substantive 
issues—and shaping services to meet the terms of a contract rather than the needs of 
clients. SIBs could encourage investors to focus on policy areas that have more readily 
measurable results . . . and encourage a focus on the ‘low hanging fruit.’” (citation omitted)).  
 120. See id. at 123 (“SIBs allow governments ‘to privatize the up-front costs of social 
innovations and the associated risks, thus reducing taxpayer expenditures in the short-
term and eliminating the risk of government money being spent on interventions which do 
not deliver the desired outcomes.’” (citation omitted)).  
 121. See Emily Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 24–32.  
 122. Arguably, the SIB is not designed to be a “safe” investment for impact investors. 
Both the Peterborough SIB and the Rikers Island SIB offered their investors the least 
attractive features of both debt and equity investments, notwithstanding efforts to mitigate 
investment risk through creative contract negotiation. See Burand, supra note 26, at 
459−60. 
 123. For example, the U.K. Cabinet Office’s Green Paper, Modernising Commission, 
reaffirmed the government’s commitment to pay-for-success programming. This in turn 
inspired the creation of the Centre for Social Impact Bonds and the establishment of a £20 
million Social Outcomes Fund. See Sinclair et al., supra note 119, at 119. 
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delivery, while coming to consensus on the underlying public 
policy values that guide their development and implementation.124 
On the one hand, there is a prevailing assumption embedded in 
the SIB model that private sector stakeholders can more 
effectively coordinate and manage social welfare services than 
cash-strapped and legislatively constrained governmental actors. 
On the other hand, this viewpoint undermines the complex nature 
of public services, which are concerned with more than simply 
quantitative assessments and instrumental programmatic goals. 
Indeed, public services also reflect “statements about ideals of 
citizenship, fraternity and solidarity, which mark the social fabric 
of a society.”125 
Critical scholars have recently begun to explore how the SIB 
model raises ethical and moral concerns for democratic 
governments.126 Employing a Kantian deontological system of 
ethics, where actions are viewed as being morally impermissible if 
they do not treat persons with “respect,”127 one may question 
whether it is in fact wrong for someone to profit directly from the 
human suffering of another individual, particularly in a way that 
undermines the autonomy of the program participants.128 SIB 
                                                     
 124. See id. at 127 (“Social Impact Bonds raise the question of what qualifies as a 
‘public’ or ‘private’ welfare service, and indeed whether this distinction is anything other 
than a technicality.”).  
 125. See id. at 129. 
 126. See generally Emma Dowling, In the Wake of Austerity: Social Impact Bonds and 
the Financialization of the Welfare State in Britain, 22 NEW POLITICAL ECON. 294, 297−98 
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1232709 [https://perma.cc/B5UP-J7QH]; 
Emma Dowling & David Harvie, Harnessing the Social: State, Crisis and (Big) Society, 48 
SOCIOLOGY 869 (2014) (explaining that government social investment market policies 
aimed at resolving a global crisis in ways that empower local communities actually foster 
further financialization and a deepening of capitalist disciplinary logics into the social 
fabric); Sinclair et al., supra note 119; Neil McHugh et al., Social Impact Bonds: A Wolf in 
Sheep’s Clothing?, 21 J. OF POVERTY & SOC. JUST. 247, 250–51 (2013) (investigating the 
moral question about what role the market should play in society in relation to social 
problems); Alex Nicholls & Alex Murdock, The Nature of Social Innovation, in SOCIAL 
INNOVATION: BLURRING BOUNDARIES TO RECONFIGURE MARKETS 1 (Alex Nicholls & Alex 
Murdock, eds., 2012) (discussing social innovation broadly conceived in the context of social 
entrepreneurship and social enterprise in their global context). 
 127. See Julia Morley, The Ethical Status of Social Impact Bonds 12−13 (unpublished 
manuscript), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56573087e4b0f60cdba13509/t/58eb6db
b5016e13683134b58/1491824060500/The-ethics-of-SIBs-submission-April-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AWM4-KZTV] (“Whereas the theory of expected utility requires decision-
makers to be hyper-rational, we can realistically this assumption in practice to say that 
agents must have well-informed expectations of the outcomes of their actions. This is 
consistent with work by moral philosophers and social theorists who have argued that 
certain kinds of activities, such as healthcare, do not lend themselves to marketisation 
without the risk of moral problems arising.”).  
 128. Indeed, the earliest SIB investors of the Peterborough SIB and the Rikers Island 
SIB relied upon the existence of prisoners and the involuntary participation in 
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advocates have traditionally responded to such concerns by 
emphasizing the benefits of the SIB model to social welfare 
delivery, justifying the morally questionable profits earned by its 
social investors on consequentialist ethical grounds129⎯the means 
of social welfare delivery are justified by the measurable benefits 
to individuals and society in terms of social welfare or utility. 
When viewed through a utility-maximization lens,130 the profit 
motive imbedded in the SIB model serves to facilitate efficient 
resource allocation, meet consumer needs, and compensate private 
stakeholders for the risks associated with their investments. 
These utilitarian arguments hinge on the presumption that free 
markets can spur economic growth, which ultimately leads to a 
higher level of aggregate utility for all. 
Conversely, some moral philosophers have criticized 
consequentialist theories of ethics, noting that different methods 
of carrying out an action often determine the nature of the 
outcome. For example, when private-sector stakeholders carry out 
public services, the outcomes may be significantly different than 
when executed by the government, even if aggregate utility 
appears to have increased. American philosopher Debra Satz 
provides guidance on identifying the characteristics of ethical or 
“moral” markets, as well as the signs of unethical or “noxious” 
markets, by observing their distributional effects.131 According to 
Satz, an increase in aggregate utility may nevertheless lead to a 
morally problematic distribution of welfare when there are 
asymmetries in information among decision-makers regarding the 
consequences of the transaction or when there is an imbalance of 
power between market participants.132 Market participants should 
be equipped with information about the likely outcomes of their 
actions that can empower them to make utility-maximizing 
decisions.133 Further, there should be an equality of power among 
                                                     
rehabilitation programs to make a financial return from their social investments. Id.; 
Abram Olmstead, Rikers Island Tackles Rearrest Rate with Social Impact Bond—a U.S. 
First, FREE ENTERPRISE (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.freeenterprise.com/rikers-island-
tackles-rearrest-rate-countrys-first-social-impact-bond/ [https://perma.cc/MM2K-3MSJ].  
 129. See Morley, supra note 127, at 9−10. 
 130. See id. at 10 n.10 (“Those who think that mere aggregation fails to capture every 
aspect of moral significance often favour some version of prioritarianism, the view that the 
goodness of an outcome depends upon the well-being of all individuals, but where extra 
weight is given to those who are worse off.”). 
 131. DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS 
OF MARKETS 92−97 (2010). 
 132. See id. at 97−98.  
 133. However, research demonstrates that decision-makers routinely make choices 
that are inconsistent with rational choice theory because they are subject to biases, framing 
effects, subjective preferences and heuristics. Thus, even with adequate information, it is 
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market participants. Whether or not these market conditions are 
attainable in the context of social welfare services,134 especially 
when those services are financed by SIBs,135 the discussion 
suggests that the inherent vulnerability of SIB constituent 
populations⎯who are typically uninformed about the financing 
details of SIB programs and lack power to make any decisions 
related to their participation136⎯may undermine the moral 
legitimacy of the SIB marketplace. 
By perpetuating the privatization of public services, the 
current SIB model may in fact erode the ability of governments to 
uphold the values and ideals of democratic citizenship, including 
“direct public and democratic accountability for welfare 
entitlements.”137 Further, by failing to meaningfully consider the 
implications of the current market-based SIB model for the 
importance of citizens’ rights in public welfare provision, SIB 
advocates may in fact reinforce a neoliberal, pro-business 
approach to public service delivery that shifts “the morality of 
welfare provision” and “changes the status of the service user from 
a citizen entitled to support into a commodity processed for 
profit.”138 Consequently, under the current SIB framework, public 
service becomes “de-moraliz[ed],” and economic development 
becomes decreasingly about delivering a vision of ethical 
democratic life grounded in solidarity and more about maximizing 
private interests to advance collective benefit.139 
Satz also notes that moral markets have two key outcomes: 
(1) no harm is done to individuals and (2) no harm is done to society 
                                                     
uncertain whether actors will make utility-maximizing decisions. See generally Herbert A. 
Simon, Rationality as a Process and as Product of Thought, in DECISION MAKING: 
DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS 58, 60−61, 66–68 (David E. Bell 
et al. eds., 1988). 
 134. See Morley, supra note 127, at 12−13 (“Whereas the standard theory of expected 
utility requires decision-makers to be hyper-rational, we can realistically relax this 
assumption in practice to say that agents must have well-informed expectations of the 
likely outcomes of their actions. This is consistent with work by moral philosophers and 
social welfare theorists who have argued that certain kinds of activities, such as healthcare, 
do not lend themselves to marketisation without the risk of moral problems arising.”). 
 135. See id. at 15 (noting that a cost-benefit analysis of the current SIB model may 
lead advocates to question “whether the spillover of knowledge from the private sector to 
the social sector, or the transfer of risk from the public sector to the private sector, can be 
achieved in some other way”). 
 136. See id. at 13, 19 (“Markets characterized by ‘very weak or highly asymmetric 
knowledge and agency’ of participants are likely to be noxious,” and “[a] crucial piece of 
information that may not be made clear to the individuals who are intervened upon by the 
SIB is that they are effectively a profit-centre for private investors.” (citations omitted)).  
 137. See Sinclair et al., supra note 119, at 129. 
 138. See id. at 131. 
 139. See id at 131−32. 
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overall.140 Regarding the first outcome, while on its face the SIB 
seems to offer great benefits to its constituent populations, the 
embedded profit motive that drives, at least in part, the decision-
making of impact investors may in fact reinforce short-term, 
incremental solutions, while deprioritizing opportunities for more 
meaningful systems change. Leading philanthropists have already 
noted the dangers of investing without an intentional focus on 
systemic change.141 Furthermore, the pervasive neoliberal, 
market-based approach to economic development may hinder the 
adoption of alternative economic frameworks that seek to shift 
development programs away from capitalism and toward more 
communitarian economic models that can more effectively 
advance economic justice.142 Simply put, private investors may be 
less inclined to radically shift an economic system that serves as 
the foundation of their profit model because they would be acting 
against the best interests of the company143⎯long understood by 
economists to be the maximization of shareholder wealth.144 
Regarding Satz’s second outcome of moral markets, it is 
unclear whether the SIB model may harm society overall. The 
design of the early criminal justice SIBs, for example, implies that 
the motivation for investing in the rehabilitation of incarcerated 
individuals need not be the achievement of broad-based 
democratic engagement or community, social, and economic 
empowerment, but can simply be the prospect of private profit for 
                                                     
 140. See SATZ, supra note 131, at 94−95. 
 141. See Walker, supra note 2 (arguing that “giving back is necessary, but not 
sufficient. We should seek to bring about lasting, systemic change, even if that change 
might adversely affect us. We must bend each act of generosity toward justice”). 
 142. For example, the “social and solidarity economy” has been declared a promising 
new approach to economic life that is participatory, inclusive and grounded in a concern for 
community empowerment. See UTTING, supra note 31, at 6 (“This umbrella term is 
increasingly used to refer to forms of economic activity that prioritize social and often 
environmental objectives, and involve producers, workers, consumers and citizens acting 
collectively and in solidarity. The broadening field of SSE involves not only traditional 
‘social economy’ or ‘third sector’ organizations and enterprises such as cooperatives, mutual 
associations, grant-dependent and service-delivery non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and community and other forms of volunteering and giving, but also myriad types 
of self-help groups organizing to produce goods and services, fair trade networks and other 
forms of solidarity purchasing, consumer groups involved in collective provisioning, 
associations of ‘informal economy’ workers, new forms of profit-making social enterprises 
and social entrepreneurs, and NGOs that are having to shift from a dependence on 
donations and grants to sustaining themselves via income-generating activities.”). 
 143. See Morley, supra note 127, at 23−24 (“This is because profit-seeking 
organisations will inevitably focus on improving the existing system—a system that is 
consistent with their own long-term success—rather than making fundamental changes 
that may conflict with their desire to maintain the status quo.”). 
 144. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS, 22−23 (Univ. 
of Chi. Press ed., 1953). 
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savvy social investors. The integration of financial incentives for 
the private sector into the delivery of public services⎯a 
marketization of social welfare service delivery⎯runs the risk of 
undermining the moral and ethical value of governmental, 
nonprofit, and philanthropic organizations dedicated to civic 
missions.145 Taken to its logical conclusion, what happens to the 
much-needed SIB program that is unable to turn a financial profit 
for impact investors? Is it simply abandoned as a failure, even if it 
makes an impact that is difficult to quantify in monetary terms? 
Further, the work of staff at social service organizations may 
suffer if their intrinsic motivation for public service work and 
personal identities as public servants are negatively influenced by 
an awareness of their role in delivering profits to external financial 
stakeholders.146 This, in turn, may compromise the long-term 
effectiveness of some social welfare programs. 
One might conclude that the purpose of the SIB is not true 
innovation at all but merely to perpetuate an increasingly 
neoliberal approach to governance. While the SIB model 
seemingly strikes a balance between place-based and people-based 
economic development strategies by providing resources to 
marginalized populations in the communities where they live, it 
nevertheless sustains a dogma of free-market fundamentalism 
that grew to prominence under President Ronald Reagan; 
continued into the Bush, Clinton, and Obama eras; and remains a 
salient force in economic life today under the Trump 
administration.147 This ideology builds upon a political and 
                                                     
 145. See Daniel Edmiston & Alex Nicholls, Social Impact Bonds: The Role of Private 
Capital in Outcome-Based Commissioning, 47 J. SOC. POL’Y 57, 72 (2018) (arguing, “the 
marketization introduced through private social investment, runs the risk of undermining 
‘the distinctive contributions that nonprofit organizations make to creating and 
maintaining a strong civil society’ through value-driven services, advocacy, voluntarism, 
community-focused social networks and civic participation”) (quoting Angela M. Eikenberry 
& Jodie Drapal Kluver, The Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector: Civil Society at Risk?, 64 
PUB. ADM. REV. 132, 132–40 (2004)). 
 146. Julian Le Grand, Knights and Knaves Return: Public Service Motivation and the 
Delivery of Public Services, 13 INT’L PUB. MGMT J. 1, 59 (“For those who are motivated to 
perform effectively by internal factors, such as their sense of professional duty and their 
altruistic concern for the welfare of the people they were serving, the use of external 
rewards or penalties at best leads to discouragement and demoralisation, and at worst 
actively promotes damaging, self-interested behavior.”).  
 147. Indeed, during the 1990s, advocates and scholars continued to advocate for 
development strategies centered on enabling the private sector to create businesses in 
distressed neighborhoods. It was often presumed, couched in stereotype and a disregard for 
the impact that structural shifts in a community can have on low-income residents, that 
“[g]iven the workforce, low-skill jobs are realistic and economically viable . . . . Over time, 
successful job creation will trigger a self-reinforcing process that raises skill and wage 
levels.” Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV. 
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economic theory that upholds the belief that human well-being 
and social innovation can best be achieved by promoting 
entrepreneurial freedom in a libertarian system of limited state 
intervention, one that fosters strong private property rights, 
intellectual property rights, free markets, individualism, and 
personal responsibility.148 
Additionally, there may be power dynamics at play that call 
into question the ethical dimension of SIBs. Scholars have argued 
that our nation’s turn away from the Keynesian fiscal and 
monetary policies embodied in President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
Great Society,149 and toward supply-side solutions to the economic 
stagflation of the 1970s,150 was driven to some degree by a desire 
to restore or “reconstruct” the class power of economic elites that 
came under attack during the Civil Rights Movement.151 Under 
this bold theory, our market-based approach to economic 
development was intentionally designed to establish the necessary 
conditions for capital accumulation by the economic elite and not 
to address the increasing problem of concentrated wealth and 
power among a small segment of our capitalist society.152  If this is 
indeed true, then the notion of liberating the market economy to 
correct market failures is coded language for turning a blind eye 
to poverty and fodder for the emergence of an oligarchical society 
committed to the rule of the few. Under this framing of economic 
development, neoliberalization offers, as social philosopher Karl 
Polanyi argued, a contradictory kind of “freedom for those whose 
income, leisure and security need no enhancing, and a mere 
pittance of liberty for the people, who may in vain attempt to make 
use of their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power of the 
owners of property.”153 However, according to Polanyi, the 
                                                     
May–June 1995, at 55, 62.  
 148. See HARVEY, supra note 36, at 64−65. 
 149. See generally Robert Higgs, The Economics of the Great Society, INDEP. INST. (Feb. 
1, 2011), http://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=3157 [https://perma.cc/W4U2-
JSW4] (explaining that Johnson’s Great Society programs included job training, housing, 
food stamps, and other forms of assistance that inadvertently helped to define Black 
inequality as primarily an economic question). 
 150. See HARVEY, supra note 36, at 22 (“During the Carter presidency . . . deregulation 
of the economy emerged as one of the answers to the chronic state of stagflation that had 
prevailed in the US throughout the 1970s.”). 
 151. See id. at 19 (“We can, therefore, interpret neoliberalization either as a utopian 
project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or 
as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore 
the power of economic elites.”). 
 152. See id. (explaining that neoliberalism has not been successful in revitalizing 
global capital accumulation outside of serving the goal of establishing an economic elite).  
 153. See id. at 37. 
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achievement of a “neoliberal utopianism is doomed” by the evils of 
“authoritarianism, or even outright fascism” in certain 
instances.154 The rise of President Donald Trump has already 
ushered in fears that we may be heading in this direction.155 
It is becoming increasingly convincing that a neoliberal 
political ideology has led many governments to conceptualize their 
role in the praxis of economic development theory as mere 
legislators of targeted incentives for private market action, rather 
than as public servants committed to the social and economic well-
being of all citizens.156 This has led to the increased privatization 
of public welfare initiatives,157 further evidenced by the evolving 
SIB model. Underlying the ecosystem of the emerging SIB model 
are the principles and values of a neoliberal political theory that 
espouse a pro-business view of economic life—(1) personal and 
individual freedom in the marketplace as paramount to a thriving 
economy and (2) individual responsibility and personal 
accountability as determining factors of social mobility, whether 
up or down the ladder of success. SIB programs routinely cast 
social problems as personal issues. This, arguably, is necessary to 
perpetuate American exceptionalism and sustain notions of an 
“American Dream” within a hegemonic global capitalist system,158 
all while simultaneously pulling the shades on America’s bitter 
legacy of state-sponsored racism and chronic imperialism. 
As a result, the SIB seemingly works according to the 
neoliberal plan,159 nurturing the vestiges of a cancerous, racially 
tainted and economically skewed vision of economic development. 
It provides opportunities for capital accumulation and the 
concentration of power amongst the economic elite by elevating the 
role of private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative in the 
provision of public welfare.160 At the same time, it downplays the 
importance of a moral and ethical commitment to advancing 
                                                     
 154. Id. 
 155. See Robin Wright, Madeleine Albright Warns of a New Fascism—and Trump, 
NEW YORKER (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/madeleine-
albright-warns-of-a-new-fascism-and-trump [https://perma.cc/M2Q5-SHZV].  
 156. See HARVEY, supra note 36, at 48. 
 157. See id. at 76. 
 158. See generally TERRENCE E. PAUPP, THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL RELATIONS 41 (2009); 
see also HARVEY, supra note 36, at 50, 65–66. 
 159. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 323 (explaining that neoliberal thought “favored 
‘facilitating capital mobility and cutting community programs that might distort private 
investment decisions’” (quoting Susan E. Clarke & Gary L. Gaile, Local Politics in a Global 
Era: Thinking Locally, Acting Globally, 551 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 28, 33 
(1997) (emphasis added))). 
 160. See Harvey, supra note 36, at 47. 
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participatory democracy, as well as an authentic commitment to 
our nation’s foundational democratic values. Due to its 
prioritization of individual accountability and responsibility, the 
capitalistic regime and neoliberal orthodoxy that drives the design 
of the SIB model has led to the continued creation of individualized 
programs to assist marginalized peoples in solving their own 
poverty, regardless of the role of the state in sustaining 
institutional barriers to social mobility.161 The SIB model 
integrates a systemic bias for capitalistic endeavors with limited 
state intervention yet allows for special state interventions when 
they further business interests and foster increased 
financialization by experts and elites.162 This imbalance of power 
and perpetuation of wealth disparities bears the marking of Debra 
Satz’s unethical, noxious market. 
Lastly, the current SIB model fails to incorporate any 
meaningful systems of social solidarity or significant restraints on 
capital accumulation that would help foster community economic 
empowerment and promote economic justice.163 Impact investors 
who are committed to advancing economic justice should reflect 
upon their various motivations for selecting and funding SIB 
programs. If the reduction of financial risks and the maintenance 
of profits remain a guiding force for how impact investors select 
and design SIB programs, then community economic 
empowerment will undoubtedly take a back seat, and true 
innovation in poverty alleviation will be a second thought. This 
Article argues that impact investors should prioritize the 
integration of a moral motivation into the calculus of their 
engagement with the SIB model, one grounded in a desire for 
social justice. Looking forward, scholars should explore new 
economic development frameworks that offer principles to guide 
the implementation of the SIB model. An intentionally designed 
“justice-based” approach to economic development would not only 
lead to more progressive social welfare programs but would also 
open the door for new ideas about economic life that can impact 
the root causes and structural determinants of poverty in America. 
                                                     
 161. Id. at 76 (“As the state withdraws from welfare provision and diminishes its role 
. . . it leaves larger and larger segments of the population exposed to impoverishment. The 
social safety net is reduced to a bare minimum in favour of a system that emphasizes 
personal responsibility.”). 
 162. Id. at 74 (“This tendency on the part of the core states like the US to protect 
financial interests and to stand by as they suck in surpluses from elsewhere both promotes 
and reflects the consolidation of upper-class power within those states around processes of 
financialization.”). 
 163. Id. at 75. 
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III. SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Initially, social impact bonds were used to fund social welfare 
programs targeting challenges in the criminal justice sector, 
specifically homing in on the problem of prisoner recidivism.164 
This was largely due to the strong alignment between challenges 
impacting the criminal justice system and the need for 
quantifiable SIB assessment metrics. The criminal justice system 
offered monetizable assessment outcomes—the reduction of 
recidivism rates could be traced directly to a reduction in public 
expenditures.165 Additionally, there has been a high degree of 
political interest in reducing the negative collateral consequences 
of mass incarceration, especially given its harmful impact on 
predominantly black, low-income communities.166 
The first SIB was launched in September 2010 in the city of 
Peterborough in the United Kingdom.167 By funding the 
Peterborough Prison Project (the “Peterborough SIB”), a prisoner 
rehabilitation program designed to reduce prisoner recidivism for 
short-term male prisoners, the impact investment paved the way 
for future criminal justice SIBs around the globe. The first SIB in 
the United States, launched by New York City in August 2012 at 
the Rikers Island Prison (the “Rikers Island SIB”), was also 
designed to reduce young adult recidivism.168 
                                                     
 164. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 13 (“The criminal justice system 
has clearly defined and monetizable outcomes, and there is high political commitment due 
to the large number of negative outcomes and resulting community pressure.”). 
 165. Peter Walker, Investors to Pay for Prisoner Rehabilitation, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 
2010), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/mar/19/investors-pay-for-prisoner-
rehabilitation [https://perma.cc/LF7F-4TQL] (“According to the St Giles Trust, a recent 
economic evaluation of its Through the Gates scheme for ex-prisoners reduced re-offending 
by 40%, saving the government £10 for every pound invested.”). 
 166. Centuries of racial oppression in America have impacted the social and economic 
development of marginalized, predominantly black communities. Since the Civil Rights 
Movement, tremendous progress has been made in advancing social justice for these 
marginalized communities. However, an era of targeted criminal justice policies following 
the civil rights movement instituted a new form of “Jim Crow,” establishing a law 
enforcement system that seemingly prioritized the mass incarceration of black men in 
predominantly low-income communities, painting a narrative of American criminality 
largely defined by poverty and race. The United States is now one of the highest 
incarcerators of its citizens among countries worldwide, and an alarmingly high percentage 
of those incarcerated citizens are both low-income and black. See generally MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
6–7 (2010). 
 167. See Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 19; see Walker, supra note 165 (“The pilot 
scheme for the so-called social impact bonds will see investors pay £5m towards intensive 
education and support for short-term prisoners leaving Peterborough prison in 
Cambridgeshire.”). 
 168. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 74; see also Burand, supra note 26, at 457 (“Like 
the Peterborough SIB, the New York City SIB is aimed at reducing prisoner recidivism and 
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These SIB programs have faced criticism and have yielded 
mixed results. After the Peterborough SIB showed early promise, 
the UK government ended the intervention earlier than planned 
and modified its national approach to probation and rehabilitation 
services. In an effort to scale the program’s success, the UK 
government decided to provide rehabilitation services for 
incarcerated individuals across the UK by using a diverse network 
of public service providers and private investors in a fashion 
similar to the Peterborough SIB.169 In contrast, the Rikers Island 
SIB in New York City was shut down early after failing to meet its 
performance benchmarks. Although the Rikers Island SIB was 
able to reach nearly 2000 adolescent males during the three years 
of its operation, it faced significant challenges navigating the 
unique climate of Rikers Island Prison and struggled to validate 
its evidence-based intervention with the target population.170 
These two examples reveal that the SIB model is still in its early 
phases, and best practices are still being defined as new programs 
are rolled out. 
A. The Peterborough Prison Social Impact Bond 
Research on the social impact bond model began in the United 
Kingdom in 2007 after the Prime Minister’s Council on Social 
Action was asked to explore economic innovations to help finance 
social welfare initiatives.171 The UK government began exploring 
SIBs as a potential funding platform to spur social change, and by 
2010, the government had published a green paper describing 
plans to utilize pilot pay-for-success programs to address 
shortcomings in the criminal justice system.172 In September 2010, 
                                                     
does so by providing funding to scale preventative social interventions.”). 
 169. See EMMA DISLEY ET AL., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE PAYMENT BY RESULTS SOCIAL 
IMPACT BOND PILOT AT HMP PETERBOROUGH: FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT 1–2 
(2015) [hereinafter FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT], https://assets.publishing.servic
e.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486512/social-impact-
bond-pilot-peterborough-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2Q6-UBPA] (stating that change to 
Peterborough model was driven by reforms to probation). 
 170. See IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE ADOLESCENT BEHAVIORAL LEARNING 
EXPERIENCE (ABLE) PROGRAM AT RIKERS ISLAND, VERA INST. JUSTICE (July 2015), 
http://secondowelfare.it/edt/file/adolescent-behavioral-learning-experience-evaluation-
rikers-island-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/83SA-DP75].  
 171. See KATE BELL & MATTHEW SMERDON, DEEP VALUE: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF 
THE ROLE OF EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS IN PUBLIC SERVICES 72 (2011) (“The Council on 
Social Action (CoSA) was an initiative chaired by Prime Minister Gordon Brown between 
2007 and 2009. It brought together innovators from every sector to generate ideas and 
initiatives through which government and other key stakeholders could catalyse, develop 
and celebrate social action.”). 
 172. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BREAKING THE CYCLE: EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENT, 
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Social Finance UK, a nongovernmental organization that helps 
fund social service organizations, led the development of the first 
SIB in the UK. As the intermediary constituent in the deal, Social 
Finance UK raised £5 million in upfront seed capital from 
seventeen private investors and philanthropists.173 The program 
was originally designed as a pilot to test the theory that providing 
incarcerated individuals with comprehensive and individualized 
support would help them not only stay out of prison but also craft 
a better life once they returned to their home communities.174 
Under the terms of the Peterborough SIB, if the program 
succeeded in reducing the rate of recidivism among the target 
population (as assessed by an independent third party), the UK 
Ministry of Justice, with financial support from the UK Big 
Lottery Fund,175 agreed to pay a return to the SIB investors that 
included the principal amount invested and a success fee, based 
on a capped sliding scale.176 However, if the predetermined 
performance targets were not met, the UK government would not 
have any payment obligations to the SIB investors.177 
The Peterborough SIB utilized the investment capital raised 
                                                     
REHABILITATION AND SENTENCING OF OFFENDERS 71 (2010), https://assets.publishing. 
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/185947/green-
paper-evidence-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/53JP-TLKC].  
 173. The pool of investors included several notable charities and foundations such as 
Barrow Cadbury Trust and the Esmee Fairbairn Foundation as well as several “high net 
worth” individuals. See Burand, supra note 26, at 454–55 n.12; see also EMMA DISLEY ET 
AL., LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PLANNING AND EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
SOCIAL IMPACT BOND AT HMP PETERBOROUGH 23 (2011), https://www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR1166.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4EJ-KXSJ].  
 174. Approximately sixty percent of short-term prisoners in the United Kingdom re-
offend within one year of their release from prison. See PRISON REFORM TRUST, PRISON: 
THE FACTS, BROMLEY BRIEFINGS 14 (2017), http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/ 
0/Documents/Bromley%20Briefings/Summer%202017%20factfile.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4
KW-SAJP]. 
 175. See FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 169, at 3. 
 176. Under the Peterborough SIB, the investors would be paid in years four, six, and 
eight of the program, based upon the performance of the One Service intervention. SOC. 
FIN., A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS CAN MOBILIZE 
PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 9 (2012), https://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sit
es/default/files/publications/small.socialfinancewpsinglefinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A6P-
VVAF] [hereinafter A NEW TOOL]. The value of the outcome payments was expected to 
generate an annual rate of return between 2.5% and 13%. Id. at 40. 
 177. The Peterborough SIB guaranteed repayment to investors if the program 
achieved at least a 7.5% reduction in the frequency of reconviction events across all 3,000 
male prisoners in the target group, or a 10% reduction for each cohort, as compared to a 
control group of other short-term male prisoners. While measuring the frequency of 
reconviction events (as opposed to a binary calculation of whether a reconviction event 
occurs) was believed to better correlate with the costs associated with recidivism, it also 
posed a risk of statistical sampling errors in measuring performance outcomes, especially 
considering the small number of prisoners in the Peterborough SIB cohorts. See id. at 9. 
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by Social Finance UK to fund a seven-year prisoner rehabilitation 
program that provided three cohorts of 1000 short-term male 
prisoners at Her Majesty’s Prison Peterborough with “through-
the-gate” transition services for up to twelve months during and 
after their release from prison.178 Specifically, Social Finance UK 
coordinated the creation of a nonprofit organization called “One 
Service,” which facilitated a voluntary prisoner rehabilitation 
program comprised of a network of nonprofit organizations 
throughout the UK.179 These social service providers worked one-
on-one with the incarcerated individuals, providing them with 
housing, education, vocational training, and healthcare services as 
they transitioned out of prison.180 The flexibility of the 
Peterborough SIB funding, coupled with the local management 
and operations of the One Service program, enabled the 
Peterborough SIB partners to create an adaptive service offering 
that responded to the needs of returning citizens in the UK.181 
Additionally, the long-term nature of the One Service program 
increased engagement between the nonprofit service providers 
and the target population.182 
The first phase of the One Service program did not reach the 
necessary performance benchmark—a 10% reduction in 
recidivism for each cohort and a 7.5% reduction across all 
                                                     
 178. See FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 169, at 11, 13. 
 179. See id. at 11–12. 
 180. Nonprofit service providers contracted by One Service included the St. Giles 
Trust, Ormiston Families Trust, John Laing Training, Mind, the YMCA, and Supporting 
Others through Volunteer Action (SOVA). See FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra 
note 169, at 26. The program was not prescribed as a part of release conditions for prisoners, 
and prisoners could choose whether or not to engage with the service. This required case 
workers to find mechanisms for cohort engagement and to build meaningful relationships. 
See id. at 9, 42–48; see Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 20. 
 181. Some of the returning citizens received housing, mental health and addiction 
support, and training for employment opportunities. See FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION 
REPORT, supra note 169, at 30, 43, 48. As one returning citizen in the program explained, 
“[t]he One Service has helped me with a training course, housing needs, food, electricity 
and someone has always been on the end of the phone even if it’s just someone to talk to . . . . 
If it hadn’t have been for this I would be back in prison by now.” See Press Release, Soc. 
Fin., Peterborough Social Impact Bond Reduces Reoffending by 8.4%; Investors on Course 
for Payment in 2016 (Aug. 7, 2014), https://assets.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/uploads/ 
20150316202925/Peterborough-Social-Impact-Bond-Reduces-Reoffending-by-8.4-
percent.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX64-L6LU] [hereinafter Press Release]. 
 182. David Robinson, chair of the Peterborough SIB Advisory Board, stated, “[t]he 
project was deliberately set up to be a long-term project so that we can learn, improve and 
refine the best ways of supporting prisoners on release.” See Andrew Holt, Results Show 
Peterborough Social Bond Demonstrate a Reduction in Reconvictions, CHARITY TIMES (July 
8, 2014), http://www.charitytimes.com/ct/Results_Peterborough_Social_%20Bond_demonst
rate_reduction_in_reconvictions.php [https://perma.cc/GU9Y-JTMH].  
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cohorts—to trigger early repayments for private investors.183 
Nevertheless, by August 2014, Social Finance UK announced that 
the Peterborough SIB had successfully reduced reoffending in the 
first cohort of 1000 prisoners by 8.4%, as compared to the national 
baseline, and was on track to disperse investor outcome payments 
by the year 2016.184 
Prompted by the early success of the Peterborough SIB 
program, the UK Ministry of Justice launched a program toward 
the end of 2014 called Transforming Rehabilitation.185 Funded by 
the UK government, the program was designed to provide 
rehabilitation services for incarcerated individuals across the UK 
using a diverse network of public service providers and private 
investors in a fashion similar to the SIB funded One Service 
program.186 Beginning in February 2015, Transforming 
Rehabilitation created the framework for the development of 
twenty-one Community Rehabilitation Companies (“CRC”) to help 
supervise the reentry of short-term prisoners across the UK.187 
Each CRC represents a diverse mix of public, private, and 
voluntary stakeholders who work collaboratively to provide 
critical social services to returning citizens.188 Transforming 
Rehabilitation has embraced the SIB model with the new CRCs as 
the service providers are only paid in full if they are successful in 
reducing recidivism based upon predetermined performance 
                                                     
 183. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PETERBOROUGH SOCIAL IMPACT BOND HMP 
DONCASTER 2 (2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/341682/pbr-pilots-cohort-1-results.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W8LJ-GW9L].  
 184. See Brinda Ganguly, The Success of the Peterborough Social Impact Bond, 
ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/success-
peterborough-social-impact/ [https://perma.cc/GWM9-2TEG]. David Hutchison, CEO of 
Social Finance, noted, “[t]he SIB has given our delivery partners the resources and the 
freedom to meet the complex needs of our prison leavers very effectively.” See Press Release, 
supra note 181. 
 185. Ganguly, supra note 184. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TRANSFORMING REHABILITATION: A 
STRATEGY FOR REFORM (2013), https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/ 
transforming-rehabilitation/results/transforming-rehabilitation-response.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2N4B-XAL2].  
 188. Almost 1,000 organizations, with 700 listed as voluntary, community or social 
enterprise, have joined the movement to develop new innovations in reducing recidivism 
and enhancing opportunities for returning citizens. Under the new system, each CRC is 
responsible for crafting a plan for each offender’s rehabilitation as soon as they enter prison, 
and the same organization is responsible for supporting them during their time in prison 
and helping them reintegrate into their home communities after their release. See Press 
Release, Ministry of Justice, Charities in Front Seat of New Reoffending Drive (Dec. 18, 
2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/charities-in-front-seat-of-new-reoffending-
drive [https://perma.cc/NMT7-VVKB].  
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metrics. The Ministry of Justice announced a curtailment of the 
Peterborough SIB in June 2015 to avoid any duplication of services 
being provided to the target population by Transforming 
Rehabilitation.189 
B. The Rikers Island Prison Social Impact Bond 
Modeled after the Peterborough SIB in the UK, the Rikers 
Island SIB in New York was the first social impact bond launched 
in the United States.190 In August 2012, then New York City 
Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg announced that investment bank 
Goldman Sachs had agreed to invest $9.6 million to finance a 
prisoner rehabilitation program targeting 3000 mostly low-income 
adolescent males, sixteen to eighteen years of age, at the Rikers 
Island Correctional Facility.191 Coordinated by MDRC, a nonprofit 
service provider serving as the SIB intermediary (paid by 
Bloomberg Philanthropies for serving in that capacity), the Rikers 
Island SIB aimed to achieve at least a 10% reduction in the rate of 
recidivism among young adult males leaving Rikers Island.192 
The Riker’s Island SIB provided the investment capital to 
finance a social service program called Adolescent Behavioral 
Learning Experience (“ABLE”), which was a part of Mayor 
Bloomberg’s comprehensive New York City Young Men’s Initiative 
that sought to address disparities between young African 
American and Hispanic males in New York City and their non-
minority peers.193 MDRC contracted with two nonprofit 
                                                     
 189. See Alice Sharman, Peterborough SIB Did Not Foster Innovation, Evaluation 
Finds, CIV. SOC’Y MEDIA (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/peterborough-
sib-did-not-foster-innovation--evaluation-finds.html [https://perma.cc/FK5G-F2ZM]; See 
FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 169, at 52 (“Although the SIB pilot in 
Peterborough was originally intended to operate until 2017, it only operated on a payment 
by results basis for the first two cohorts of released prisoners, while the third cohort of 
prisoners received support under a fee-for-service arrangement.”). 
 190. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 74. 
 191. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor 
Gibbs and Corr. Comm’r Schriro Announce Nation’s First Social Impact Bond Program 
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/285-12/mayor-bloomberg-
deputy-mayor-gibbs-corrections-commissioner-schriro-nation-s-first#/0 
[https://perma.cc/TXN8-K4E3]. 
 192. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 4. 
 193. The cross-agency enterprise instituted broad policy changes and agency reforms 
that, over the course of three years, planned to invest more than $127 million into programs 
connecting young African American and Hispanic males in New York City to educational, 
employment, and mentoring opportunities. Notably, the initiative planned to overhaul the 
Department of Probation by connecting probationers to economic and educational 
opportunities, strengthen educational support, and target the achievement gap by 
providing mentoring, literacy, and college and career readiness services. Additionally, the 
initiative sought to target the wealth gap by connecting young men to employment 
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organizations to facilitate the ABLE Program, which planned to 
break the cycle of re-incarceration using an evidence-based 
cognitive behavioral therapy intervention called Moral Reconation 
Therapy (“MRT”).194 Delivered through the jail’s onsite school, the 
facilitators of the ABLE program sought to engage detained youth 
and help them transition to life outside of prison by helping them 
develop critical social and decision-making skills, while also 
teaching them principles of personal responsibility to help them 
avoid “unwise” future decisions.195 
Unlike the Peterborough SIB, only one impact investor 
supported the Rikers Island SIB, global investment bank Goldman 
Sachs.196 Additionally, the investment was to be made in the form 
of a multiple-disbursing loan, a staggered and conditional 
disbursement schedule that would permit Goldman Sachs to stop 
making loan disbursements if interim program targets were not 
met.197 Under the SIB contract, Goldman Sachs stood to earn a 
return on their investment of as much as $2.12 million in 
profitswith outcome payments structured on a capped sliding 
scale.198 Upon the successful completion of the rehabilitation 
program, Goldman Sachs would be repaid by the New York City 
Department of Correction, which served as the outcome payer for 
the SIB. The outcome payment would be based upon the city’s cost 
savings after gaining the ability to close a section of Rikers Island 
Correctional Facility due to reduced incarceration rates.199 
                                                     
opportunities. Discussing the New York City Young Men’s Initiative, Mayor Michael R. 
Bloomberg stated, “[w]hen we look at poverty rates, graduation rates, crime rates, and 
employment rates, one thing stands out: Blacks and Latinos are not fully sharing in the 
promise of American freedom and far too many are trapped in circumstances that are 
difficult to escape.” See Jennifer Epstein, Bloomberg’s Own $30M for Program, POLITICO 
(Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/08/bloombergs-own-30m-for-program-
060654 [https://perma.cc/Q4DB-9H2Y].  
 194. The ABLE program, which was administered by the Osborne Association and 
Friends of Island Academy, engaged with 87% of the adolescents that entered Rikers Island 
Prison in 2013. Program participants were provided with education, job training, and 
counseling. See Jim Parsons et al., Impact Evaluation of the Adolescent Behavioral 
Learning Experience (ABLE) Program, VERA INST. JUSTICE 5, 7, 14 (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.vera.org/publications/rikers-adolescent-behavioral-learning-experience-
evaluation [https://perma.cc/X8J9-JZV4].  
 195. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 5. 
 196. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 74–75.  
 197. See Godeke & Resner, supra note 43, at 22.  
 198. The outcome payment ranged from $4.8 million for a two-year recidivism 
reduction rate of at least 8.5% to $11.7 million for a two-year recidivism reduction rate of 
at least 20%. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 5.  
 199. The government’s cost savings, which would always exceed private investor 
returns and were projected beyond the length of the SIB deal, were predicted based upon 
the program serving approximately 3000 participants each year. The success payments 
were to be prorated if the program was unable to serve the projected number of participants. 
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However, if the rate of reincarceration events was not reduced by 
at least 10% from its historical rate, no payment obligations would 
be triggered under the SIB. Interestingly, even if the ABLE 
program was deemed unsuccessful, Goldman Sachs would only 
lose up to $2.4 million of its $9.6 million investment, due to a 
partial payment under the capped sliding scale and a loan 
guarantee provided by Bloomberg Philanthropies.200 
The Vera Institute of Justice (“Vera”), which served as the 
independent evaluator for the Rikers Island SIB, was paid by the 
Mayor’s Fund to Advance NYC to evaluate the success of the 
ABLE program. Vera conducted its performance assessment of the 
ABLE program by comparing the selected study group with a 
matched historical group of men previously jailed prior to the 
program’s establishment.201 In August of 2015, after evaluating 
the first year of program delivery, Vera concluded that the 
program was failing to meet its recidivism goals, and the ABLE 
program at Rikers Island was discontinued.202 
Although the ABLE program was able to reach nearly 2000 
adolescent males during the three years of its operation, it faced 
significant challenges throughout its lifespan. For example, only 
9% of the target population completed all 12 stages of the program, 
                                                     
See Berlin, supra note 77, at 7; see also David Chen, Goldman to Invest in City Jail Program, 
Profiting if Recidivism Falls Sharply, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/02/nyregion/goldman-to-invest-in-new-york-city-jail-program.html [https://perma. 
cc/7BU9-RZ7N].  
 200. Unlike the Peterborough SIB, the impact investor in the Rikers Island SIB, 
Goldman Sachs, secured a credit enhancement in the form of a $7.2 million rolling loan 
guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropies. At the end of the ABLE program, if performance 
targets were missed, MDRC would not be required to pay back anything to Goldman Sachs 
beyond the guaranteed funds. If the program was successfully completed, and there were 
leftover guarantee funds, MDRC could retain the funds to support future SIBs. This rolling 
guarantee structure provided an incentive for MDRC as the intermediary to ensure that 
the SIBs performance targets were met, so that leftover guarantee funds could be used to 
finance future projects. See Burand, supra note 26, at 458–59; see also V. Kasturi Rangan 
& Lisa Chase, The Payoff of Pay-for-Success, 4 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 28, 32–33 
(2015).  
 201. Vera was forced to use a quasi-experimental approach in its evaluation, rather 
than employing a “randomized control trial” method, because adolescents at Riker’s Island 
Prison are moved frequently between different housing units which would have interfered 
with coordinating separate treatment and control groups. Vera tracked “recidivism bed 
days” (RBDs) which captures the number of days that a member of the study group was 
held in jail during the 12 months following their release from prison. In addition to tracking 
RBDs for the study group and comparing it to a matched historical group, Vera also tracked 
RBDs for 19-year-olds during the same period because rates of recidivism fluctuate over 
time, and group changes may be the result of factors that are unrelated to the program, 
such as citywide changes in crime rates or policing. See Parsons, supra note 194, at 8–11. 
 202. The deal had included an option for the partners to end the program early with 
the city paying nothing to the investor if it failed to reduce recidivism by at least 9% in the 
first year. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 5. 
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largely due to the instability of the adolescent’s length of time in 
prison and the periodic cancellation of scheduled program 
activities.203 Additionally, a high level of stress among adolescent 
inmates and a culture of gang violence and intimidation at Rikers 
Island often conflicted with the primary goals of MRT and the 
benefits of group therapy.204 
Although the Rikers Island SIB was deemed unsuccessful, 
advocates of the SIB model have highlighted the valuable lessons 
learned from the program that hold promise for the future of the 
SIB model in the United States. Alongside saving the government 
from using limited taxpayer dollars to fund an ineffective social 
service program, both the government and the nonprofit service 
providers gained support to explore new innovations in criminal 
justice reform.205 The New York City Department of Correction 
and the City’s Office of Management and Budget had limited 
discretionary funding to finance the MRT program at Rikers 
Island, and it was unclear at the outset whether cognitive 
behavioral therapy would work for adolescents in such a prison 
setting.206 The Rikers Island SIB provided the necessary risk 
capital for New York City to explore this innovation and determine 
its viability. Goldman Sachs has continued to invest in the SIB 
marketplace, demonstrating a continued commitment to the SIB 
model among impact investors.207  
IV. THE OPPORTUNITIES OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
Advocates of the SIB model have highlighted several 
opportunities that emerge from its use in the social impact space, 
premised on its unique design and market-based funding 
structure.208 First, SIBs promote the expansion of investment 
capital toward traditionally underfunded social welfare programs 
                                                     
 203. The adolescents experienced security-related events at Riker’s Island Prison on a 
daily basis, such as lockdowns and alarms that often interfered with MRT sessions. See id. 
at 6. 
 204. Although ABLE also offered MRT in various locations in the community where 
adolescents leaving Rikers Island Prison were returning, few of the adolescents attended 
due to competing activities like school or court-mandated meetings. See id. 
 205. See Jones, supra note 20, at 361 (noting “because SIBs require data, metrics, and 
benchmarks, nonprofit service providers and government can gain insight from data and 
use it more effectively; this result is not available in a traditional social service model where 
data is collected after the fact, tracking the amount of service provided or the number of 
beneficiaries receiving the service”).  
 206. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 7.  
 207. See Jones, supra note 20, at 361. 
 208. See Caroline Preston, Getting Back More Than a Warm Feeling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/giving/investors-profit-by-giving-through-
social-impact-bonds.html [https://perma.cc/3MWU-A3D5].  
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addressing critical social issues, especially important during an 
era of governmental fiscal austerity and decreased funding for 
social welfare initiatives. Secondly, the SIB model shifts the 
investment risk of funding social welfare programs to the private 
sector, which not only stands to reduce public spending on risky 
initiatives but also can increase the efficient management of public 
funds. Lastly, the SIB model shifts government contracts away 
from a commonly reactionary approach to social service provision 
toward evidence-based, preventative social welfare programs, 
which can lead to long-term government cost savings and 
meaningful social impact in marginalized, underserved 
communities. The sections below discuss each of these 
opportunities in turn. 
A. Expanding Investment Capital for Social Innovation 
One of the opportunities of the SIB is its ability to funnel 
additional capital toward traditionally underfunded social welfare 
programs,209 especially important during an era of fiscal austerity 
at the federal, state, and local government levels.210 The 
government has historically utilized strategic partnerships with 
private institutions to help finance large-scale public 
infrastructure projects.211 Governments have recently taken an 
interest in leveraging these same public-private partnerships to 
help meet the funding gap for the delivery of social welfare 
programs, targeting a wide range of social issues from education 
to poverty, the environment, and public health. The private and 
philanthropic sectors have also demonstrated an interest in 
                                                     
 209. See Eva Coruzzi Schneider, Note, Disparate Impact Lacks an Impact: The Need 
for Pay for Success Programs to House Formerly Incarcerated People, 44 FORDHAM URB. L. 
J. 529, 570 (2017) (noting that “the PFS model expands access to a market previously 
unavailable to nonprofits”). 
 210. See UTTING, supra note 31, at 8–9 (“The capacities of welfare states have been 
undermined by market forces, neoliberal ideology and fiscal constraints, particularly in 
contexts of regressive taxation, structural adjustment in developing countries and austerity 
policies associated with the fallout from financial crises in parts of the global North.”); See 
Peter Gosselin, Here’s How You Add 2.4 Million Jobs to the Economy, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/government-austerity-exacts-
toll-on-u-s-jobs-wages-and-growth [https://perma.cc/VP3P-8HEK] (“The nation’s retreat 
from tax cuts and spending increases to promote the recovery has been a bipartisan affair. 
Democratic President Barack Obama and Republican House Speaker John Boehner agreed 
in 2011 to apply the fiscal brakes by negotiating $1 trillion in spending cutbacks over 10 
years and a process to impose more.”). 
 211. For example, governments have used public-private partnerships to finance toll 
roads, airports, and even energy generation facilities. See Government Support in 
Financing PPPs, WBG (Sept. 8, 2016), https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/financing/government-support-subsidies [https://perma.cc/29C6-43FM].  
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addressing these social challenges, which has resulted in a 
growing market for social impact investments. These impact 
investments are “intended to create positive impact beyond the 
financial return” for socially-minded investors.212 The SIB 
provides a unique platform for the convergence of these interested 
stakeholders around structured social welfare programs that 
target critical social issues.213 
Despite the SIB model’s growing popularity, advocates hold 
varying opinions on how SIBs should be used to help expand 
investment capital for social innovation, largely based upon 
different views of the preferred risk profile for SIB projects. As 
noted earlier in this Article,214 some advocates believe that SIBs 
should focus on providing low-risk investment capital for proven 
social welfare programs. This strategy will not only help to reduce 
the financial risk for impact investors but also potentially reduce 
public spending on expensive remedial programs. Other critics 
suggest that SIBs should solely focus on identifying and scaling 
innovative, unproven ideas that are too risky for the government 
to explore and would otherwise go underfunded or untested. These 
preventative social welfare programs may yield long-term 
governmental cost savings for the communities they serve and 
offer more meaningful resources for their constituents. 
Driven by impact investors who seek to maximize social 
impact while minimizing financial risk, the design of the current 
SIB model will likely lead local and state governments to prioritize 
institutional social service providers who offer low-risk, proven 
social welfare programs. Unfortunately, this may come at the 
expense of riskier innovations or may undermine smaller, 
community-based service organizations that are well positioned to 
leverage local assets. Notwithstanding, due to a lack of data on the 
effectiveness of many large-scale social welfare programs, it will 
                                                     
 212. O’DONOHOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 5. A 2015 survey of 158 investors revealed 
that the global impact investing market committed more than $15 billion to impact 
investments in 2015 and plan to increase capital committed by 16% in 2016. See ABHILASH 
MUDALIAR ET AL., J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., 2016 ANNUAL IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY, 
GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK 5 (2016), https://thegiin.org/assets/2016%20GIIN%20
Annual%20Impact%20Investor%20Survey_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/29GH-ZZPQ ]. While 
the market shows continued growth, it represents a small portion of total assets under 
management worldwide, which is expected to exceed $100 trillion by 2020. See MICHAEL 
LIERSCH, BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH, MILLENNIALS AND MONEY 12 (2013), http://files.
webydo.com/15/156383/UploadedFiles/f37e3c56-3213-49fd-a201-df7b9e596f35.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YKG2-NFVX].  
 213. See Gustafsson-Wright et. al., supra note 21, at 2 (“[I]mpact bonds can focus on 
the delivery of human services as opposed to the traditional physical infrastructure that 
has often been the center of both public-private partnerships and performance contracts.”).  
 214. See supra Section II.C. 
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remain difficult in the short-term for impact investors to easily 
identify proven programs that should be expanded or sustained.215 
Further, even if investors are able to identify proven, low-risk 
social welfare programs that stand to benefit from increased 
funding, it is unclear whether the administration of such programs 
should remain the primary role of the government.216 Indeed, the 
precedent set by the UK government with the Peterborough Prison 
SIB is compelling. After the One Service program at the 
Peterborough Prison was deemed successful at reducing prisoner 
recidivism, it was retooled into a broader government-funded 
initiative.217 The UK government not only reclaimed control over 
the administration of the rehabilitation program but also 
simultaneously opened the door for impact investors to fund new 
SIBs exploring other innovative solutions to pressing social 
challenges.218 
Impact investors who take an interest in the SIB model will 
likely vary in both the profile of their risk appetite and the size of 
their capital contributions to SIB contracts. While some investors 
will seek to maximize the achievement of social justice, other 
investors may prioritize a financial return on their investment at 
the expense of achieving all the stated social goals of SIB funded 
social welfare programs. This is to be expected, as the current SIB 
model is designed as an alternative approach to advancing social 
good within our current global capitalist system, a system built 
upon the maximization of private profit as a foundational 
principle. These conflicting values not only complicate the capital 
structure of SIB deals, they may ultimately hinder the success of 
some SIB projects, making the government stakeholder a critical 
player in advocating for the underlying civic mission of every 
program.219 This Article urges SIB advocates to explore the 
development of a more progressive justice-based CED framework 
that can help shift the priorities of impact investors toward more 
democratic, “moral” motives that will help advance economic 
justice. 
                                                     
 215. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 20–21.  
 216. See supra Section II.D.  
 217. See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 187, at 8.  
 218. Id. 
 219. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 5 (“[T]he syndicate of social investors 
within any given SIB are likely to have different (and potentially conflicting) motivations, 
which can lend itself to a layered capital structure.”).  
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B. Transferring Investment Risk to the Private Sector 
Traditionally, government contracts for social welfare 
services are premised on the achievement of programmatic 
outputs rather than performance outcomes.220 Additionally, 
financial risks are typically shared by both the contracting 
government entity and the contractors providing the social 
service.221 In some instances, contractors assume most of the 
financial risks in the transaction by agreeing upfront to secure 
capital from investors to fulfill their contractual obligations. These 
contractors often only receive payment from the contracting 
government entity after their predetermined programmatic 
outputs have been achieved. In other instances, the contracting 
government entity bears most of the financial risks by agreeing 
upfront to provide a fixed payment to the contractor, coupled with 
additional “success fees” if the predetermined programmatic 
outputs have been met. Thus, the investment risks of social 
welfare delivery typically lie in the hands of service providers or 
government stakeholders. 
The SIB model shifts the traditional government contracting 
paradigm by placing private investors into the middle of the 
government-contractor relationship. Impact investments become 
the source of upfront working capital for contractors, and 
governments are required to repay private investors only after 
predetermined, quantifiable performance outcomes have been 
achieved. This shift in investment risk provides an opportunity to 
reduce public spending on risky social service initiatives, which 
scholars have argued may increase the efficient usage of public 
funds, as well as reinforce the importance of social innovation.222 
Nevertheless, scholars have also noted that the financial risks 
imposed on SIB investors under the conventional SIB model may 
limit the pool of impact investors because of the underlying 
capitalist values that are embedded in the model’s market-based 
design.223 SIB advocates have sought to incorporate a number of 
financial risk-mitigation and risk-sharing tools into SIB deals, 
such as credit enhancements and loan guarantees, in an effort to 
                                                     
 220. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 528.  
 221. See supra Section IV.B. 
 222. See Burand, supra note 26, at 467.  
 223. See id. at 478. But see id. (noting that as SIBs evolve, “other financial  
risk-mitigation and risk-sharing tools, such as credit enhancements that provide external 
collateral or support senior investment tranches in the capital structure of the SIB could 
be incorporated into the SIB structure”).  
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cater to investors profit-seeking motivations.224 As the SIB 
marketplace continues to evolve, creative risk-sharing 
strategies225 or alternative investment schemes226 may help to 
further expand the pool of SIB investors. Notwithstanding the 
diversity of efforts to address tangible market concerns, this 
Article argues that the pool of impact investors interested in the 
SIB marketplace will likely not dramatically increase until their 
funding motivations shift away from profit maximization toward 
social and economic justice. 
Additionally, due to their market-based design, SIBs that 
seek to shift the investment risk of social welfare programs to the 
private sector may in fact hinder innovation in service delivery. As 
private stakeholders take a more active role in the delivery of 
public services, more oversight and accountability are to be 
expected. However, the introduction of additional systems of 
performance measurement and program management can lead 
social service providers to shift their focus from flexible service 
delivery to efficient outcome achievement.227 As a result, social 
service providers may engage in less experimentation during 
service delivery and instead focus more attention on innovations 
that reduce short-term costs rather than improve service quality 
or program effectiveness.228 In some instances, the SIB model may 
even run the risk of promoting dysfunctional or unethical practices 
by certain social service providers where such behavior can lead to 
more effective outcome achievement.229 In short, the 
marketization of public services may lead to unethical decision-
making. This Article calls for a shift in the framing of the SIB 
model that can lead impact investors to rethink their funding 
                                                     
 224. For example, see the risk mitigation strategies used in the Rikers Island SIB, 
supra Section III.B.  
 225. See A NEW TOOL, supra note 176, at 15, 22 (discussing the potential impact of 
creative risk-sharing innovations to the growth of the SIB marketplace). 
 226. For example, the concept of a “micro” SIB could facilitate smaller investments. 
See EAN GARRETT ET AL., THE MICRO SOCIAL IMPACT BOND: A FRAMEWORK FOR 21ST 
CENTURY SOCIAL INNOVATION, INFINITE 8 INSTITUTE L3C 3–5 (2015), https://issuu.com/ 
infinite8institute/docs/themicrosibwhitepaper_final_ [https://perma.cc/WJX3-JKAY].  
 227. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 65 (explaining that for some SIB 
service providers, “the degree of micro-management built into the SIB was actually 
reducing their flexibility to autonomously pursue their social mission . . . stakeholders felt 
that the resources and time that went into these additional forms of performance 
management and measurement could be better spent on front-line services”).  
 228. See id. at 66 (“Whilst intensive, real-time performance measurement and 
management introduced a heightened degree of responsiveness, discipline and rigor to 
contracts, it also detracted resources from front-line service provision and reduced the 
autonomy of some front-line practitioners.”). 
 229. See id. at 65; see also supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
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motivations, as well as lead to more creative economic 
development strategies that may better advance community 
economic empowerment and foster democratic engagement in 
CED. 
C. Prioritizing Evidence-Based Preventative Programs 
Alongside expanding the funding pool for social welfare 
programs and transferring investment risk to the private sector, 
the SIB model provokes a shift in the culture of traditional, 
performance-based government contracts by encouraging 
government stakeholders to prioritize evidence-based, 
preventative social welfare programs.230 Typically, in 
performance-based government contracts, government 
constituents negotiate directly with social service providers to 
accomplish predefined goals or objectives. The government 
constituent identifies a social problem and seeks to minimize the 
financial risk to taxpayers by marketing an achievable social 
service contract to private contractors.231 Under such contracts, 
government payments are typically based upon performance 
outputs—i.e., the number of individuals reached through the social 
welfare program.232 These contracts are often remedial in nature, 
targeting social problems as they arise, or after they have 
materialized, all of which further mitigates political and financial 
risk.233 In these traditional performance-based government 
contracts, the government assumes a substantial percentage of the 
financial risks, often leading to a preference for short-term 
projects lasting from one to two years.234 
In contrast, evidence-based SIB programs are premised on the 
achievement of performance outcomes, not performance outputs. A 
SIB program typically determines success based upon the 
achievement of measurable changes in the behavior of the 
individuals within the target population. Although such 
behavioral changes are difficult to predict, when this approach is 
                                                     
 230. See JOHN K. ROMAN ET AL., FIVE STEPS TO PAY FOR SUCCESS: IMPLEMENTING PAY 
FOR SUCCESS PROJECTS IN THE JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 14 (June 2014), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413148-Five-Steps-to-
Pay-for-Success-Implementing-Pay-for-Success-Projects-in-the-Juvenile-and-Criminal-
Justice-Systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/39D4-NR58]; see also Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra 
note 21, at 2 (“Insufficient attention to performance and to measuring and being held 
accountable for results can lead to poor outcomes even with abundant funding. These 
failures are often inextricably linked to political and institutional constraints.”). 
 231. See Burand, supra note 26, at 464–65. 
 232. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 528. 
 233. See Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 12; see also Burand, supra note 26, at 463. 
 234. See Burand, supra note 26, at 465. 
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successful, it can yield beneficial long-term impacts for the target 
community. For example, in the case of social welfare programs 
targeting prisoner recidivism, traditional performance-based 
government contracts would determine success based upon the 
number of individuals receiving job training or educational 
counseling. The SIB model pushes stakeholders to develop more 
robust assessment metrics linked to concrete evidence of 
behavioral change.235 In the case of prisoner recidivism, such 
evidence has been defined as a reduction in the rate of reconviction 
events among the target population. By prioritizing evidence-
based programs, state and local governments learn to better 
quantify the costs of addressing social inequities, and social 
service providers learn to better measure the benefits of their 
social service interventions, all of which may drive enhanced 
performance management for human service delivery.236 Early 
intervention and prevention strategies have already proven to 
yield benefits for children and adults in various sectors.237 Further, 
the SIB model attracts longer-term financing from impact 
investors, which can extend the period of time over which pay-for-
success contracts are conducted by facilitating funding maturities 
with longer performance horizons, all of which supports better 
programming.238 
                                                     
 235. With improved data collection processes, governments and social service 
providers can develop a better understanding of how their target constituents interact with 
their social programs. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 526. This, in turn, can lead to 
services that are better fitted to the needs of marginalized communities. See Justin Milner 
& Matthew Eldridge, From Evidence to Outcomes: Using Evidence to Inform Pay for Success 
Project Design, URB. INST. 8 (May 3, 2016), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/ 
evidence-outcomes-using-evidence-inform-pay-success-project-design [https://perma.cc/ 
NSP7-C6A8] (asserting that “[u]sing evidence to make public welfare decisions improves 
government effectiveness and drives better outcomes for society”). 
 236. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 43; see also David Stoesz, 
Evidence-Based Policy: Reorganizing Social Services Through Accountable Care 
Organizations and Social Impact Bonds, 24 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 181, 181 (2014) (“As 
evidence-based policy replaces unconditional entitlements, lawmakers will prefer program 
activities that are substantiated through field experiments, especially randomized 
controlled trials, which show lower cost while producing superior outcomes, over 
predecessors. . . . [S]ocial service employment opportunities will shift toward more effective 
programs and away from programs that have not demonstrated comparable efficacy.”). 
 237. For example, Goldman Sachs recently became the first “successful” social impact 
investor in the United States with their investment in a SIB program in Utah focused on 
early childhood education. Principals at Goldman Sachs explained, “[w]e believe this model 
holds promise because it is scalable, replicable and sustainable. It provides a new 
framework for thinking about how the public and private sectors can work together to 
address pressing social needs in a way that results in better outcomes for children, 
alleviates some of the financial burden on taxpayers and generates savings for 
governments.” Berlin, supra note 77, at 19. 
 238. See Burand, supra note 26, at 465 (noting that “whereas traditional government 
contracts typically articulate the amount of funds to be expended, the type of services to be 
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By incorporating a broader network of stakeholders in deal 
making, SIBs enable governments to share the risks of funding 
economic development, which may encourage the creation of 
innovative social welfare programs that are both preventative and 
forward-looking in nature.239 The SIB model gives the private 
sector a substantive role in deciding which social services are 
delivered to the public and a voice in influencing the methods used 
to achieve negotiated performance outcomes.240 However, 
notwithstanding assertions that diversity at the decision-making 
table can help promote social justice, there is risk in placing 
decision-making authority that is traditionally reserved for the 
government—such as determining the amount of funds to be 
expended, selecting social service providers, defining the types of 
services to be delivered, and replacing underperforming 
stakeholders—into the hands of private sector stakeholders.241 
When private sector stakeholders can disrupt the continuity of 
critical social welfare services solely based upon a financial risk 
assessment, community constituents who are the beneficiaries of 
such social welfare programs stand to suffer.242 This risk is further 
amplified by the fact that many SIBs premise their performance 
metrics on the validation of administrative data and not on more 
complex evaluation methods that may better assess program 
performance in light of the social dynamics and historical 
frameworks impacting target populations.243 Indeed, SIBs often 
oversimplify the complexity and intersectionality of historic social 
challenges in an effort to identify quantifiable performance 
metrics.244 
                                                     
delivered, and the delivery methods to be used, SIBs can be structured so as to give private 
sector players more latitude to decide which services are to be delivered and which methods 
are to be used to achieve targeted levels of performance outcomes”). 
 239. But see infra text accompanying Section V.A (explaining that institutional 
investors seeking to minimize financial risk may shy away from funding unproven, 
innovative social welfare programs, thereby hindering innovation). 
 240. For example, in the Peterborough SIB, the SIB intermediary, Social Finance UK, 
was delegated authority over selecting program service providers, a role typically conducted 
by the government stakeholders until that time. See Burand, supra note 26, at 465 (noting 
that “government procurement processes typically give government officials the ultimate 
decision-making authority regarding which social service providers to fund and whether to 
replace underperforming social service providers”). 
 241. See id., at 466. 
 242. See Sinclair et al., supra note 119, at 126 (“This can lead to ‘mission-drift’ (or shift) 
as investors pressure service providers to prioritize outcomes that are more readily 
measured and away from the most needy.”). 
 243. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 69. 
 244. Jones, supra note 20, at 362 (revealing that “the complexity of social problems 
requires comprehensive and multiple interventions and not short-term results; ‘quick fix’ 
approaches to social problems may hinder public discourse about the complexities and 
 
4-Toussaint v3 (Do Not Delete)  9/21/2018 3:49 PM 
206 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 56:1 
There may be further hurdles in delegating traditional 
governmental functions to non-governmental stakeholders, 
ranging from statutory roadblocks to cultural challenges. 
Administrative laws governing public-private partnerships at the 
state level may limit the authorities and rights that can be 
contractually delegated to private parties.245 Additionally, 
government stakeholders, who retain authority to modify or cancel 
the terms of SIB contracts, may threaten the success of SIB 
programs when politics clashes with policy. If a government 
stakeholder modifies or cancels a SIB program during a change in 
political leadership, or when the benefits of long-term contracts 
are revealed to heighten short-term political risk, private 
stakeholders may find their hands tied even if they are guided by 
a moral conviction to advance economic justice at great financial 
costs. There is need for knowledge sharing and the development of 
best practices for SIB governance models that can overcome these 
dangers. Further, SIB advocates need to identify how best to 
integrate a diverse network of stakeholders while maintaining the 
integrity of every SIB’s civic mission.246 
V.  THE CHALLENGES FACING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
Notwithstanding the opportunities offered by the SIB model, 
each opportunity also poses challenges for stakeholders. First, the 
complexity of negotiating SIB deals presents a hurdle to their 
widespread adoption. They are expensive, require extensive due 
diligence, and can impose a high level of financial risk on private 
investors. Secondly, SIBs often face significant execution risks. 
Under-resourced governments may lack the resources to 
implement SIB deals, and social service providers may fail to live 
up to their performance goals or collaborate effectively with other 
stakeholders. Lastly, a high level of political risk faced by 
government stakeholders has challenged the widespread adoption 
of the SIB model as a viable social impact tool. Government 
stakeholders must not only be adequately resourced to navigate 
the complex SIB development process but must also contend with 
                                                     
realities of social problems. . . . Other approaches, such as reducing misdemeanor arrests, 
disrupting the school-to-prison pipeline, changes to the bail system, and raising the age of 
criminal responsibility would have significant impact on the numbers who cycle though 
Rikers.” (citation omitted)). 
 245. See Burand, supra note 26, at 466. 
 246. See Burand, supra note 26, at 467 (“The likelihood of refinements reinforces the 
need for those participating in early SIB arrangements to engage in what at least one 
commentator has termed ‘high value learning,’ so that the lessons of both successful and 
unsuccessful SIB structures can be shared broadly and quickly.” (quoting LIEBMAN, supra 
note 44, at 20)).  
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the politics of administration changes and the impact of diverse 
political opinions about social welfare programs in the face of long-
term contractual obligations. The following sections discuss these 
challenges in turn.  
A. Minimizing Transaction Complexity 
SIBs are often touted as bringing enhanced “market 
discipline” to government contracts for social welfare programs, 
leading to more robust due diligence, enhanced accountability, and 
improved managerial expertise.247 However, in practice, SIB deals 
face a range of complexities that can make them an impractical 
tool for many communities. First, private investors may lack the 
subject matter expertise to adequately assess program design and 
evaluation, while government entities may lack the expertise 
necessary to connect program success metrics with short-term or 
long-term budgetary savings. Second, SIB advocates may 
undermine the importance of the intermediary, who plays a 
critical role in connecting SIB stakeholders to community 
constituents and also helps stakeholders understand the needs of 
the target community. An ill-equipped intermediary can cripple 
the implementation of a SIB deal before it has a chance to reap 
social rewards for impact investors. Lastly, impact investors will 
face continued financial risks as they strive to promote innovative 
programs while also seeking to earn a financial return on their 
investments. This Article argues that a shift in motivation is 
necessary for impact investors to resolve these contradictory goals. 
Because SIBs integrate evidence-based outcome metrics into 
their program design, SIB deals require a high level of due 
diligence beyond that of the traditional public-private 
partnership.248 Not only is due diligence for each new SIB program 
                                                     
 247. Berlin, supra note 77, at 13; see Burand, supra note 26, at 461; see Jennifer Miller 
Oertel et al., Proving That They Are Doing Good: What Attorneys and Other Advisors Need 
to Know About Program Assessment, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 693, 696 (2013) (noting that “donors 
are looking for objective means to assure that the funds they have given have achieved the 
intended outcomes”). But see supra Section II.B (noting that the introduction of additional 
systems of performance management may hinder innovations in service provision). 
 248. Under a typical partnership between traditional community economic 
development lenders, due diligence is focused on assessing the ability of the loan recipient 
to execute the deal or project, while also identifying any risks that would preclude future 
repayment of lenders and investors. Conversely, in a SIB deal, stakeholders must conduct 
due diligence within a broader matrix of issues, including: the design of the social service 
program and its ability to effectively address the identified social problem within the 
targeted population; the framework for measuring the success of the social service program 
and its connection to the program’s selected evidence-based outcome metrics; and the 
connection between the program’s success metrics and the host government agency’s cost-
accounting system, which is critical to calculating the success payment for investors that, 
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expensive, it is also time-consuming, which could threaten the 
prospect of future cost savings altogether.249 Impact investors and 
philanthropists are currently exploring innovative program 
models that, once widely adopted and standardized, may reduce 
due diligence and transaction costs. However, as investors seek to 
lower the risk profile and transactions costs of SIB deals by 
standardizing and replicating proven social welfare programs, 
community-based organizations and community coalitions may 
become further silenced in community development conversations. 
Institutional investors and national nonprofits that deliver social 
welfare programs built upon “best practices” may not reflect the 
true needs of residents living in low-income, marginalized 
communities. Their assumptions and biases, based upon national 
statistics and generalized survey data, may impede the efforts of 
grassroots, community-based organizations that understand how 
to leverage existing community assets and community 
relationships that are constantly in flux.250  Seeking to minimize 
transaction costs may undermine efforts to engage smaller, less 
resourced community stakeholders, which can hinder long-term 
economic justice. 
The selection of the SIB intermediary plays an important role 
in the due diligence process.251 Government stakeholders often 
lack reliable budgeting and costs data systems, making it difficult 
to craft reliable estimates of cost savings for SIB programs. A 
competent and reliable SIB intermediary can help government 
stakeholders navigate the SIB research and development process. 
Nevertheless, even with an experienced and reliable intermediary, 
a preference for innovative social welfare programs that are 
                                                     
in part, justifies their investment. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 19. 
 249. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 70 (“A number of cross-sectoral 
stakeholders interviewed for this study felt that the high transaction costs associated with 
developing the SIB threatened the future cost savings achievable.”); STELLINA 
GALITOPOULOU & ANTONELLA NOYA, OCED, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 3 
(2016), http://www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/UnderstandingSIBsLux-WorkingPaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E8Y3-K6MY] (“They have entailed significant transaction costs that 
stakeholders should consider before embarking on them.”).  
 250. Indeed, the success of the Utah SIB was based, in part, on the assumption that 
all of the at-risk children in the program, for whom English was a second language, would 
have been placed in special education without the intervention. See Berlin, supra note 77, 
at 19–20. 
 251. For example, in the Rikers Island SIB, MDRC conducted significant due diligence 
to learn about Rikers Island Prison’s daily operations and assessed whether cognitive 
behavioral therapy could both fit into the culture and routine of the facility and be 
integrated into the life of returning citizens in their home communities. Additionally, 
MDRC identified potential savings to the New York City Department of Corrections and 
created payment terms for the SIB investors, all of which required an analysis of the city’s 
complex budgeting formula. See id. at 11–13. 
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untested or unproven will expose SIB investors to financial risk,252 
ultimately leading to increased transactional complexity. 
Investors in SIB deals have limited means to manage the risks of 
their investment during the lifecycle of the SIB because repayment 
is triggered by an independent third-party’s evaluation of the 
program’s net “social” impact. If impact investors maintain a 
primary focus on minimizing the risk of financial loss by 
embedding safety measures into deals, and not on maximizing 
social impact, SIB deals will inevitably retain a high level of 
complexity or simply choose to avoid innovative, yet risky projects 
altogether.253 
Alongside loan guarantees from the philanthropic 
community,254 some SIB contracts also contain provisions that 
release parties from their contractual obligations if another party 
is unable to fulfill their agreed-upon responsibilities. Some SIBs 
have even incorporated early termination provisions for impact 
investors, which can have harmful impacts on government 
stakeholders who are left to service the community constituents 
left behind.255 While these provisions offer protections for 
investors, they also introduce challenges for the sustainability of 
SIB programs as they evolve over time. This Article urges both 
impact investors and SIB advocates to explore alternative 
                                                     
 252. SIBs that prioritize innovative and unproven social welfare programs—far 
similar to an equity investment for a venture investor than a typical loan or bond 
repayment for a CED lender—bring even greater financial risks. See id. at 9. 
 253. For example, some private investors have required loan guarantees from the 
philanthropic community to mitigate their financial risk. In the Rikers Island SIB in New 
York City, Goldman Sachs relied upon a guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropies to 
provide security for potential financial losses. Bloomberg Philanthropies also provided 
funding for the deal in a variety of other ways, including grant money to pay for a pilot 
phase of the program and funding for the operating expenses of the intermediary 
organization. See Eduardo Porto, Wall St. Money Meets Social Policy at Rikers Island, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/business/economy/wall-st-money-
meets-social-policy-at-rikers-island.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4CYR-J727].  
 254. As the SIB ecosystem evolves and becomes an increasingly attractive impact 
investment for financial institutions, philanthropists will likely continue to play an 
important risk mitigation role because of the challenge in establishing risk profiles for SIB 
investments and quantifying expected rates of return for innovative and “unproven” SIB 
programs. This is not unlike the role played by philanthropists during the evolution of 
financing for low-income housing. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 18. Some scholars suggest 
that philanthropists should play a more principal role in SIB structures. SIBs provide 
philanthropists with the commitment of governments to help support and scale their 
successful programs. Moreover, the philanthropic community has a variety of tools, 
including grants and program-related investments, which positions it to more readily 
provide risk capital for innovative and “unproven” models for social reform. See id. at 21. 
 255. The Rikers Island SIB included such a provision, enabling investors to terminate 
the deal after three years if performance targets were not being reached. See Gustafsson-
Wright et al., supra note 21, at 19. 
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economic systems that can shift economic development programs 
away from the market moralities of capitalism and toward more 
community-oriented frameworks, such as the community-focused 
“social and solidarity” economy.256 Unfortunately, unless they are 
driven by a primarily moral and philanthropic motivation to 
advance economic justice, rather than a profit-seeking motivation 
to minimize financial losses, impact investors will likely continue 
to complicate SIB deals with financial risk mitigations schemes. 
Currently, SIB stakeholders have sought to overcome 
financial risks by introducing flexibility into the management of 
SIB deals.257 SIBs are often built upon inflexible loan agreements 
with predetermined performance metrics and program 
benchmarks, fixed time periods for program implementation, and 
fixed costs that influence the calculation of expected returns for 
investors. The rigidity of SIB contractual terms can become a 
stumbling block for program adaptability and real-time 
innovation. However, social welfare programs operating in low-
income, marginalized communities with unpredictable challenges 
require operational flexibility.258 As a result, it is important for 
SIBs to include mechanisms that enable stakeholders to respond 
quickly to unexpected operational challenges given the complexity 
and intersectionality of the myriad social factors that challenge 
community development efforts. In other words, transaction 
complexity may be a necessary evil of many SIB deals moving 
forward.  
B. Navigating Execution Risk 
SIBs face a high level of execution risks due to the complexity 
of each SIB deal, which is designed to address the unique 
challenges of the target community. Governments with limited 
experience in using pay-for-success contracting for social welfare 
                                                     
 256. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 16.  
 258. Similar to the Rikers Island SIB in New York City, other SIBs in the United 
States targeting recidivism have encountered challenges with meeting their recruitment 
goals during the early stages of their programs. For example, both the Center for 
Employment Opportunities (CEO) SIB project in New York State and the Roca PFS SIB 
Project in Massachusetts met similar challenges. A decrease in the size of the target 
population that can be reached by the service provider not only impacts projected 
government cost savings but also decreases the population sample size required for effective 
program evaluation. The New York State CEO SIB project sought to overcome this program 
design risk by building in additional time in the program schedule to accommodate 
shortfalls in program recruitment. However, this also lengthened the term of the program, 
exposing the deal to greater political risk and imposing greater financial risk on the 
investors. See id. at 15–16; see generally Jones, supra note 20, at 362–69. 
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services may face difficulty linking the selected social issues with 
governmental budgetary expenditures. Further, not all 
governments are equipped to effectively collaborate with private 
sector stakeholders, determine measurable performance targets, 
estimate the costs of funding social service initiatives, or calculate 
appropriate performance success fees that can provide a return to 
impact investors while ensuring cost savings for the public.259 
Some government stakeholders may even resist the delegation of 
public decision-making authority to private stakeholders due to 
ethical considerations.260 
Under-resourced governments face the risk of inappropriately 
pricing the financial costs and returns that will be generated from 
SIB deals. Some of the benefits, or hidden costs, of SIB deals may 
only be realized in the medium- to long-term, and critical insights 
may only be learned in hindsight.261 As a result, as in other types 
of public-private partnerships,262 governments may face pressure 
from private investors to renegotiate the terms of SIB deals over 
time or even to shut down SIB programs that are failing to meet 
performance goals, which can have a harmful impact on SIB 
beneficiaries.263 This risk is even more likely when a market-based 
perspective drives the funding decisions of impact investors. 
Without an informed understanding of the long-term implications 
of certain governmental expenditures, government stakeholders 
may be forced to rely upon outside experts, which adds additional 
transactional costs to SIB deals. 
Ensuring the sustainability of social welfare programs and 
the continuity of services is also a critical component of measuring 
success. While it might be feasible for private investors to simply 
terminate a failing project that does not meet performance 
                                                     
 259. See Burand, supra note 26, at 474. 
 260. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Burand, supra note 26, at 474 (explaining that this design element leaves 
sponsoring host governments “vulnerable to the criticism that the SIB returns payable to 
investors are too rich for the risks that are being taken”). 
 262. See, e.g., Eduardo Engel et al., Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in Public-Private 
Partnerships, 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15300, 2009), 
http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/34605e1898c5635608b0e744498f19d5829ca
a48.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NMG-2WY7] (“One of the problems with PPPs is that 
renegotiations of contracts are pervasive. Guasch (2004) examined nearly 1,000 Latin 
American concession contracts awarded between the mid 1980s and 2000, and found that 
30% of all contracts were renegotiated. The pro- portion reaches 54.4% in the transportation 
sector (roads, ports, tunnels and airports) and 74.4% in the water sector.”). 
 263. See Burand, supra note 26, at 475 (noting that “[o]ne way to mitigate this risk is 
to build success-fee formulas for SIBs that correlate directly with the savings generated by 
the performance outcomes being funded”). 
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benchmarks,264 government stakeholders cannot as easily turn a 
blind eye to communities that need the important social services 
that are being provided by SIBs. In fact, government stakeholders 
may suffer long-term costs by not continuing to fund and operate 
even moderately successful social welfare programs that are 
launched by SIBs, even when they fail to meet performance 
benchmarks.265 Governments that embrace the SIB model will 
need to identify contingency strategies to account for missed 
performance targets, budgeting missteps, and underperforming 
stakeholders that threaten the success of SIB deals.266 Scholars 
have noted that this private sector induced “shut down” risk may 
be compelling reason enough not to use SIBs to finance and scale 
core governmental public services.267 
One of the most significant contributors to execution risk is 
the role of social service providers and the SIB intermediary. 
Although a SIB deal and its accompanying social welfare program 
may be designed in accordance with best practices, the selected 
social service providers may nevertheless fail to live up to 
performance goals or collaborate effectively with other 
stakeholders.268 Additionally, the SIB intermediary may not 
adequately coordinate and manage the ecosystem of SIB 
stakeholders.269 To address this concern, scholars have argued for 
a focus on social service providers and SIB intermediaries with a 
proven track record of success and the capacity to grow programs 
to scale without sacrificing the quality of service delivery.270 
However, preexisting biases and/or assumptions may favor well-
known, institutional organizations at the expense of smaller, or 
emerging community-based groups.271 An economic development 
                                                     
 264. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 70 (“By virtue of the outcome-based 
contracts underpinning the SIB model, services focus on achieving social outcomes, rather 
than the continuity of service outputs characteristic of conventional public-sector 
commissioning.”). 
 265. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 22; see also Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 
71 (noting that “the fragility with which certain social outcomes are secured and 
maintained points to the importance of service continuity and support infrastructure 
existing alongside SIBs offering more intensive, if only temporary, assistance to target 
populations”). 
 266. See Burand, supra note 26, at 470. 
 267. See LIEBMAN, supra note 44, at 4 (“The duty to avoid harming treatment 
populations may limit social impact bonds to programs that don’t provide ‘core’ services.”). 
 268. See supra Section II.C. 
 269. See A NEW TOOL, supra note 176, at 21. 
 270. See Burand, supra note 26, at 469 (defining capacity as “leadership talent, staff, 
governance, management information systems, quality controls, back-office systems, etc.”). 
 271. SIBs run the risk of excluding smaller organizations from funding and delivering 
services. See Sinclair er al., supra note 119, at 126. For example, under the Peterborough 
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initiative that undermines or ignores existing community-based 
assets may prove to be ineffective in the long-term mission of 
addressing the root causes of structural inequality.272 There are 
mixed opinions within the nonprofit community about the value of 
SIBs, perhaps tied to these very concerns.273 Encouragingly, SIB 
advocates have already begun to develop important program 
assessment tools to aid the implementation of SIBs.274 
Nevertheless, as new SIB programs are created and SIB advocates 
target potential service providers with the capacity and resources 
to operate social welfare programs, they must also consider how 
their programs are helping to develop an “ecosystem of support” 
for community-based social service providers as well.275 
                                                     
SIB, it was “estimated that a SIB contract would need to be worth at least 12 million to 
cover such overheads as legal fees, evaluation expenses and investor’s due diligence costs.” 
Id.; see also Edmiston et al., supra note 145, at 60 (noting that “the majority of SIB contracts 
have been awarded to larger third sector organizations, which suggests a lack of sufficient 
risk redistribution to allow smaller third sector organizations to participate”). 
 272. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 304 (“The discourse fails, however, to take into 
account the structure and relational constraints placed on certain geographic places, like 
low-income, inner-city communities, that are currently marginalized and increasingly 
disconnected from the mainstream of American society.”); see also Morley, supra note 127 
at 21 (“For example, job creation SIBs may address certain problems related to structural 
unemployment, but may fail to address the fundamental problems of economic growth, class 
issues, poverty and poor educational attainment among lower socioeconomic groups that 
are the root cause of youth unemployment.”). 
 273. See Pay for Success, Social Impact Bonds: Principles on New Funding 
Mechanisms, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.councilofnonprofit
s.org/trends-policy-issues/pay-success-social-impact-bonds-principles-new-funding-
mechanisms [https://perma.cc/3UJR-VCR2] (noting that SIBs are “neither the cure-all 
remedy for every social problem or public funding short-fall as promoted by some nor the 
guaranteed disaster in every circumstance warned by others. Rather, they are nuanced 
tools that can be appropriate in certain situations”).  
 274. See Lantz & Iovan, supra note 116 (discussing the Project Assessment Tool 
developed by the Urban Institute Pay for Success Initiative, which was designed to 
“promote ‘good practices’ in defining social problems, selecting strong interventions, 
designing and implementing PFS projects, and conducting rigorous evaluations”); see also 
id. (discussing key principles to guide entities considering pay-for-success projects or other 
social finance models). 
 275. See Burand, supra note 26, at 469. It is worth noting that educational institutions 
have played an influential role in the development of the SIB “ecosystem of support.” For 
example, the Government Performance Lab at Harvard University Kennedy School (GPL), 
a product of its Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab (SIB Lab), provides technical 
assistance to governments interested in pay-for-success initiatives. See Government 
Performance Lab, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/ [https://perma.cc
/N5L2-BK6A] (last visited Sept. 8, 2018). The Sorensen Impact Center, housed in the Policy 
Lab at the David Eccles School of Business at the University of Utah, has promoted 
"private, public, and social sectors together in uncommon partnerships [to] harness the 
power of the capital markets to address critical social and environmental 
challenges." See The Sorenson Impact Center and Social Finance Re-Open Pay for Success 
Competition, SORENSON IMPACT, DAVID ECCLES SCH. OF BUS., UNIV. OF UTAH (July 12, 
2018), https://sorensonimpact.com/pay-for-success-structuring-grant-press-
release/?rq=social%20impact%20bond. In 2017, a Pay for Success and Social Impact 
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C. Overcoming Political Risk 
The success of SIBs, and the continued commitment of impact 
investors to supporting social innovation, depends in part upon the 
ability of government stakeholders to remain invested in SIB 
deals. As a central figure in each SIB arrangement, government 
stakeholders can hinder SIB participants from meeting their 
respective obligations in a variety of ways. Government 
constituents agree to use predetermined cost savings that are 
generated during the lifecycle of the SIB to repay private investors 
upon the achievement of predefined outcome performance metrics. 
However, not all projected cost savings materialize in the short-
term, especially as laws and policies change over time. Further, 
not all private investors are willing to wait more than three to four 
years to earn a return on their investment.276 
The sophistication of the government stakeholder poses risks 
for the success of every SIB deal. Not all government stakeholders 
have the necessary resources or capacity required to navigate the 
transactional complexities and challenges of SIBs.277 Moreover, 
with the cycle of government administrations typically lasting 
only a few years, SIBs face the risk that future government 
administration will not honor the terms of existing SIB contracts 
due to changes in government leadership or shifts in 
political/economic conditions. These are critical areas of concern, 
particularly considering the increasing role that government 
stakeholders are playing in the regulation and monitoring of the 
SIB marketplace.278 
                                                     
Finance conference was held at the University of Virginia, Darden School of Business, 
Institute for Business in Society. See Tori S. Yang, Professor Mary Margaret Frank Leads 
Discussions at 2017 Pay for Success and Social Impact Finance Conference, INST. FOR BUS. 
SOC’Y DARDEN (Feb. 24, 2017), https://blogs.darden.virginia.edu/ibis/2017/02/24 
[https://perma.cc/HKW8-7N3D]. In May 2017, New York University Law School launched 
the Grunin Center for Law and Social Entrepreneurship, poised to be a leader on issues of 
law and social entrepreneurship. See Grunin Center for Law and Social Entrepreneurship, 
N.Y.U., http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/grunin-social-entrepreneurship [https://perma.cc/ 
PB5T-CXG7] (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).  
 276. See Burand, supra note 26, at 456–57 n.21 (“Social Finance representatives have 
noted that they think that three to four years may be the maximum length that SIB 
investors would be willing to wait for outcome payments, particularly given the illiquidity 
of SIB investments.”); see also FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 169, at 38–
41. 
 277. See Burand, supra note 26, at 473–74 (“Among the minimum abilities that host 
governments will need in order to conduct a SIB negotiation are the abilities to determine 
performance targets, to estimate the likely costs of funding interventions to reach those 
targets, and to calculate the performance success fees (over those estimated costs) that are 
likely to attract sufficient investors to fund the SIB while still preserving savings for the 
host government.”). 
 278. See supra Section II.B (discussing political history of SIB marketplace in the U.S). 
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The private interests of specific government actors can also 
pose counterparty risks that threaten the success of SIB deals.279  
SIBs require a high level of coordination among the various 
stakeholders in a typical deal, both during the design and the 
implementation of SIB programs. Weak governance, or poor 
executive leadership, can impair the long-term viability of SIB 
deals.280 The lifecycle of SIBs generally needs to extend beyond the 
term of one government administration to reach their full 
maturation. As a result, there must not only be wide government 
support for a SIB program to be sustainable but also the support 
of public institutions and community stakeholders to hold future 
government administrations accountable. Unfortunately, it is 
often uncertain whether a future government administration will 
honor the payment commitments of a current political 
administration,281 especially when changes in leadership bring 
changes in political ideology that conflict with the philosophical 
goals underlying the previous administration’s social welfare 
initiatives.282 Several states in the U.S. have taken legislative 
steps to advance the development of SIB transactions and counter 
                                                     
 279. When governments transition from one political party to the next, some political 
figures may seek to avoid the reputational risk of supporting innovative SIB programs that 
fail to achieve their social service goals. See Burand, supra note 26, at 480 (discussing how 
reputational risk can have far-reaching implications for the SIB, including how a highly 
publicized SIB controversy could trigger the contagion risk of a wider collapse in the SIB 
marketplace); see also Lantz & Iovan, supra note 116 (“For example, an evidence-based teen 
pregnancy intervention that would increase women’s access to long-acting reversible 
contraceptives may meet with moral or religious objections from elected officials, public 
agency leadership, or community-based groups. As another example, some people object to 
supportive housing interventions that combine subsidized/free housing with social services 
to people with active substance abuse problems, because they believe taxpayers should not 
be providing housing support to people who use illegal drugs.”). 
 280. See Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 35 (discussing the value of executive 
leadership in catalyzing the development of SIB programs). 
 281. Governments generally cannot create budget obligations that extend into future 
legislatures and impose restrictions on future government spending. SIBs require 
appropriate legal conditions to ensure that governments can make payments under the 
contract beyond the fiscal year in which a contract is made. It may be necessary for legal 
conditions to be created to facilitate directing funds to an intermediary organization; to 
enable the intermediary to make certain decisions on behalf of government constituents, 
such as selecting service providers; and to define how the host government will treat hybrid 
investments that include both debt and equity components. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., 
supra note 21, at 6. 
 282. Multi-year SIBs that commit host governments to repay private investors based 
upon the future success of the program may need special authorization and appropriate 
legislation to bind the host government to long-term, pay-for-success contractual 
obligations. See Burand, supra note 26, at 476; see also Cox, supra note 30, at 979 (“Typical 
appropriations statutes are often unable to commit the government to either multi-year or 
contingent contracts . . . .”). 
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the threat posed by these counterparty risks.283 More work still 
remains. 
Governments also face the risk of SIB stakeholders taking 
unethical actions to meet performance targets or overstating the 
impact of their service programs to attract future funding support, 
all of which comes at the expense of SIB beneficiaries and host 
communities.284 This issue has already arisen in the microfinance 
sector, where the presence of increased private sector capital in 
recent years has led some microfinance institutions to rapidly 
scale their services without providing adequate customer 
protection safeguards.285 Where a dishonest or overly ambitious 
SIB social service provider uses inappropriate means to ensure 
programmatic success, government stakeholders will be pressured 
to step in and fill the void, which will increase transaction costs 
and potentially erode government cost savings. Government 
stakeholders will need to negotiate these “step in” rights during 
the development of SIB deals to authorize their ability to act on 
behalf of other stakeholders; and to ensure that the beneficiaries 
of the SIB deal, especially the residents of the communities where 
SIB programs are located, are not negatively impacted by 
unanticipated program failures.286 
                                                     
 283. For example, in 2012 in Massachusetts, the government passed legislation 
establishing a trust fund to authorize up to $50 million for pay-for-success contracts and to 
provide that governmental payment obligations would constitute “a general obligation of 
the commonwealth for which the full faith and credit of the commonwealth shall be pledged 
for the benefit of the providers of the contracted government services.” See generally MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 10, § 35VV (2012); see Burand, supra note 26, at 476–78; see also Schneider, 
supra note 209, at 575 n.361 (“General legislation has been passed or introduced in 
California, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Washington; contract legislation 
passed or introduced in Colorado, Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of 
Columbia.”). 
 284. See, e.g., Burand, supra note 26, at 470; see also Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 
145, at 59 (“In certain instances, the marketisation of social outcomes has been found to 
compromise service quality and integrity due to ‘gaming’ and perverse incentives.”); see also 
supra Section II.D (discussing ethical concerns of SIBs). 
 285. For example, according to Burand, supra note 26, at 470:  
[A] social service provider participating in a SIB aimed at reducing the number of 
children residing in foster care might start returning children to dangerous family 
situations without sufficient regard for the children’s safety. Or a social service 
provider participating in a SIB aimed at prisoner recidivism might interfere with 
legal processes to ensure that reconviction rates are delayed or inappropriately 
frustrated during periods when SIB reconviction targets are to be measured.  
See also Edmiston et al., supra note 145, at 59 (“In certain instances, the marketization of 
social outcomes has been found to compromise service quality and integrity due to gaming 
and perverse incentives.”). 
 286. To combat the risk of unethical behavior, host governments can require rigorous 
due diligence, include provisions in the SIB contract for termination or replacement rights 
in the event of unethical or inappropriate actions by stakeholders, and include financial 
penalties in the SIB contract in the event of a pattern of unethical or inappropriate behavior 
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Navigating the intervention model risk posed by the selected 
service program may prove more difficult. While some scholars 
suggest that limiting SIB funding to proven social welfare 
programs can minimize this risk,287 this may obscure the role of 
government and undermine the potential for social finance to scale 
innovation.288 Additionally, it may lead SIB advocates to overlook 
underfunded innovative social welfare programs, especially in 
cases where social welfare programs have outcomes that are 
difficult to quantify using performance metrics.289 This seems to 
obscure the very purpose of SIBs, which many have argued is to 
promote innovation in public service delivery. Further, not all 
effective social welfare programs can be scaled without impacting 
the quality of services being offered. As the ecosystem of SIB deals 
evolve, it may be useful for governments to establish independent 
“watchdog” organizations that can help to regulate the behavior of 
stakeholders participating in SIB deals and ensure that the needs 
of vulnerable populations impacted by SIB programs are 
prioritized.290 Additionally, SIB advocates should continue to 
create resource banks and toolkits to assist host governments in 
developing and managing SIB transactions.291 
VI. CONCLUSION 
“Philanthropy is commendable, but it must not cause the 
philanthropist to overlook the circumstances of economic injustice 
which make philanthropy necessary.” – Rev. Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. 
 
“[T]he term revolutionary, as I am using it does not connote 
violence; it refers to the qualitative transformation of fundamental 
                                                     
by stakeholders. See Burand, supra note 26, at 471 n.59.  
 287. See id. at 468–69; see also Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 19. 
 288. See Sections II.C–D.  
 289. Meghan Joy & John Shields, Social Impact Bonds: The Next Phase of Third Sector 
Marketization?, 4 CAN. J. NONPROFIT & SOC. ECON. RES., Autumn 2013, at 39, 48; Toby 
Lowe & Rob Wilson, Playing the Game of Outcomes-Based Performance Management. Is 
Gamesmanship Inevitable? Evidence from Theory and Practice, 51 SOC. POL’Y ADMIN. 981, 
992–95 (2017); McHugh, supra note 126, at 249. 
 290. See Burand, supra note 26, at 471–72; see also McGrath, supra note 20, at 822 
(“One of the steps the government can take to greatly improve impact investing is 
strengthening the industry infrastructure through changes in regulation, as well as 
establishing sufficient leadership to monitor the market.”). 
 291. See Burand, supra note 26, at 474 n.62; see also McGrath, supra note 20, at 822 
(“Encouraging and developing specialists impact investment managers and impact 
investment intermediaries would attract investment, provide data and analysis, and 
implement the necessary cultural changes in mainstream finance.”). 
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institutions, more or less rapidly, to the point where the social and 
economic structure which they comprised can no longer be said to 
be the same.” – Bayard Rustin292 
 
There is a story about capitalism that often goes untold in the 
narrative of the American Dream. When Andrew Carnegie built 
his famous steel empire in the rich tradition of American 
imperialism,293 he did so on the backs of low-income workers, often 
through unethical business practices and shady corporate deals.294 
As corporations today receive praise for their corporate 
philanthropy and impact investment portfolios, many of which will 
increasingly include the SIB model of social welfare delivery,295 
they also routinely hunt for ways to lower their tax burdens and 
maximize their corporate profits at the expense of employee 
benefits, all while hiding the hypocrisy of unethical market 
moralities behind the thin veil of charity.296 Indeed, while many 
have praised Jeff Bezos for embracing Andrew Carnegie’s 
philanthropic tradition by donating millions toward the education 
of immigrants, few are lifting the veil and questioning why his 
company relies so heavily on independent contractors; why so 
many of his employees are on food stamps; why local governments 
with struggling educational systems are channeling limited 
                                                     
 292. Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, 
in THE CIVIL RIGHTS READER; BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 337, 340 
(Leon Friedman ed., 1968). 
 293. While a discussion of America’s imperialist tradition of chattel slavery and racial 
terrorism, and its connection to the growth of America’s global economy, is beyond the scope 
of this Article, see generally IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO 
CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA (2000); DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY 
ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO 
WORLD WAR II (1st ed. 2008). 
 294. See Ed Burmila, Jeff Bezos, Amazon and Why ‘Charity’ Is the Wrong Solution, 
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/amazon-jeff-bezos-
richest-man-philanthropy-charity-w515535 [https://perma.cc/8FCV-72VJ] ([“Andrew 
Carnegie’s wealth] was built in no small part on the low pay and shabby treatment of his 
workforce for decades. And he hired strikebreakers to kill his employees who dared to 
unionize (the infamous Homestead Strike of 1892 was at the main Carnegie Steel plant and 
resulted in the workforce being replaced with non-union immigrants). He used every legal 
subterfuge available, as was common during the Robber Baron era, from price-fixing and 
collusion to bribery and brute force to build his business empire.”). 
 295. Impact investing by U.S. foundations currently comprises approximately “one-
half of 1 percent of grant spending” and “2 percent of endowment spending.” Rangan, supra 
note 200, at 35. Accordingly, there is much opportunity for increased funding in social 
finance innovations like the SIB. Id. 
 296. See Burmila, supra note 294 (“Imagine if people like Bezos and companies like 
Amazon paid in practice anywhere close to the tax rates that apply to people of such great 
wealth in theory. Imagine if a company of such staggering wealth—$43 billion in revenue 
in a single quarter of 2017—paid its employees enough to send their own kids to college.”). 
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taxpayer dollars to court his company as it seeks a new 
headquarters location; why a CEO donating 0.03% of his net 
worth, the equivalent of a person worth $1 million donating $300, 
is worthy of such widespread acclaim?297 Amazon is just one 
example of many. 
These facts point toward the need for a new “gospel of wealth,” 
a reimagining of philanthropy that begins to explore the root 
causes of poverty and the structural determinants of systemic 
oppression. To many philanthropists and impact investors, the 
emerging social impact bond model seems to be a step in the right 
direction toward finally realizing that new vision. And it may very 
well be. The SIB, which seemingly finds a middle ground between 
place-based and people-based economic development strategies, 
represents a promising approach to addressing criminal justice 
and other social challenges. Tapping into the altruistic 
motivations of socially conscious impact investors, it provides a 
platform for the private market to bear the financial risks of 
preventative, forward-looking social welfare programs. Further, 
the SIB model is increasingly being used by governments around 
the world to address a wide array of social challenges, providing 
much needed investment capital for innovative social welfare 
programs that otherwise would likely go unfunded. 
Specifically, as discussed in this Article, the SIB model 
provides for the expansion of investment capital for social 
innovation, the transfer of investment risk from the public sector 
to the private sector, and the prioritization of evidence-based 
preventative social welfare programs. Nevertheless, as this Article 
has revealed, the SIB model also presents critical challenges to its 
stakeholders, including the high level of transaction complexity of 
SIB deals, the significant execution risks that arise during the 
implementation of complex SIB deals, and the political risks that 
threaten the longevity of SIBs. Further, under the influence of a 
pervasive dogma of free-market fundamentalism, and a dominant 
neoliberal political orthodoxy that shape program design, the SIB 
model perpetuates the privatization of public welfare service 
delivery. This practice may erode the ability of governments to 
uphold the values and ideals of democratic citizenship and 
maintain their primary role as both the protectors and providers 
of public welfare. 
The integration of financial incentives for the private sector 
into the delivery of public services—a marketization of public 
welfare service delivery—runs the risk of undermining the moral 
                                                     
 297. See id. 
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and ethical value of nonprofit and philanthropic organizations who 
are dedicated to civic missions.298 Perhaps this is to be expected, 
given the hegemonic capitalist system that undergirds America’s 
philanthropic efforts.299 Indeed, as Andrew Carnegie argued, 
perhaps capitalism and its discontents are “beyond our power to 
alter.”300 Nevertheless, as public service becomes increasingly “de-
moralized,” and economic development becomes increasingly less 
about delivering a vision of ethical democratic life grounded in 
solidarity, and more about maximizing private self-interests to 
advance collective benefit, SIB advocates must be wary of not only 
hindering community empowerment but also undermining social 
justice. 
As a result, notwithstanding its potential for positive social 
impact across a wide range of social issues, including the criminal 
justice sector, the SIB model will likely struggle to meaningfully 
impact systemic social and economic inequality because of its 
grounding in a capitalist economic system that often hinders 
democratic engagement and undermines economic justice. The 
current SIB model fails to meaningfully wrestle with our nation’s 
history of institutional racism and racial segregation that has 
entrenched entire communities into the ditches of poverty.301 
While the current SIB model has perhaps set us on the path 
toward a new “gospel of wealth,” more work remains for us to find 
salvation from the sins of capitalism.302 Looking forward, scholars 
should explore new economic development frameworks to guide 
                                                     
 298. See Jones, supra note 20, at 361–62 (“SIBs divert investments away from 
philanthropy and increase the burden on the third sector, thereby undermining claims that 
the private sector is bearing the SIB risk.”). 
 299. See CARNEGIE, supra note 4, at 1, 3 (“It is well, nay, essential for the progress of 
the race, that the houses of some should be homes for all that is highest and best in 
literature and the arts, and for all the refinements of civilization, rather than that none 
should be so. . . . The price which society pays for the law of competition, like the price it 
pays for cheap comforts and luxuries, is also great; but the advantage of this law are also 
greater still, for it is to this law that we owe our wonderful material development, which 
brings improved conditions in its train.”). 
 300. Id. at 1. 
 301. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 351 (explaining that economic development 
programs often ignore “configurations of poverty segregated by race or ethnicity” and 
“threaten[] to harden these boundaries beyond all hope of remedy because the program[s] 
ignored current structural and historical policies that have shaped and configured our 
racialized landscape”). 
 302. As Michael Edwards has written, there is a class of social justice advocates who 
are looking for ways to “transform economic power structures and ways of living together, 
rather than just using markets as instruments to deliver social goods.” Such individuals 
“put a lot more emphasis on supporting collective action and the empowerment of those 
usually classified as beneficiaries in order to seek systemic change in public health, in 
education, and elsewhere.” See MICHAEL EDWARDS, SMALL CHANGE: WHY BUSINESS WON’T 
SAVE THE WORLD 28 (2010). 
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the implementation of the SIB model. Specifically, a justice-based 
approach to economic development—one that prioritizes economic 
justice and democratic engagement in the economic development 
process—can perhaps lead to more innovative social welfare 
programs, while also opening the door for new ideas that will 
meaningfully impact the root causes and structural determinants 
of poverty.303 
This Article has not called for an abandonment of capitalism. 
Instead, it suggests that it may be worthwhile to explore new 
blended economic models that may better facilitate philanthropy 
and address the stubborn issue of poverty in America. 
Interestingly, if we dug below the surface of the word 
philanthropy, we would discover that it translates, stemming from 
the Greek and the Latin, to the phrase loving people.304 Have we 
created an economic system where the few are gifted opportunities 
to profit from the oppression of the many and then invited to love 
themselves, more and more, through praised acts of so-called 
“charity” or “social” impact? Or should we instead reconsider who 
philanthropy is calling us to love? Dare I say, if we aspire to be a 
truly democratic nation who loves her citizens and values the 
ideals of justice and individual self-worth, then until community 
becomes an integral part of our new gospel of wealth, corporate 
philanthropy will simply be a misnomer, and impact investing 
another financial scheme of neoliberalism’s economic ploy. 
 
                                                     
 303. A robust discussion of such an economic justice framework, including the ways in 
which it may promote democratic values, is beyond the scope of this Article. The Author 
intends to explore this line of inquiry in future scholarship. 
 304. See Philanthropy, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
philanthropy [https://perma.cc/NTH4-XRAX] (last visited July 2, 2018).  
